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Abstract
This dissertation provides a theoretical study of bank and household capital struc-
ture and how they shape real allocations in the economy.
The first chapter presents a theory of bank capital structure based on a governance
problem between the banker, outside equity investors, and households. The banker
determines both the investment level in a project and its financing. A unique mix of
equity capital and short-term debt maximizes the project’s surplus for the investors.
However, if the rents in banking are high and the banker’s internal funding is scarce,
the equilibrium features lower equity financing than the social optimum, implying
a higher likelihood of bank runs and under-investment in the project. A minimum
equity capital requirement simultaneously reduces the risk of bank runs and increases
the investment level, while the banker is unambiguously worse-off.
The second chapter analyzes a portfolio problem with non-recourse debt. A
risk-averse agent finances investment in a risky asset using a loan collateralized by
the asset itself. The lenders offer her a competitive menu of interest rates and
margin requirements. Her choice depends on her optimism about the asset values
relative to the lenders, her risk aversion, and her wealth. The chapter uncovers
a complementarity between the demand for the risky asset and the leverage ratio
to finance this demand. A more optimistic agent buys a greater quantity of the
risky asset, and is more levered. This co-movement result provides key insights into
household debt: the mortgage loan-to-value ratio and the mortgage debt-to-income
ratio should be pro-cyclical.
The third chapter introduces a general equilibrium framework of credit markets
ix
in which households and banks borrow and lend from each other. The equilibrium
determines not only the interest rate and also two leverage ratios for the banks and
the households. I find that a positive shock to asset values leads to a credit boom
and higher household leverage, amplified by the general equilibrium effect of rising
interest rates.
x
Chapter 1
Real Effects of Bank Capital
Structure
1.1 Introduction
The level of equity capital in banking is under intense scrutiny following the
substantial impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the real economy. The large U.S.
financial institutions, bank holding companies and investment banks, had 3 − 5%
book equity-to-asset ratios at the beginning of 2007. To limit the damaging effects
of a similar systemic bank run in the future, Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires that
the quantity and the quality of capital held by banks conform to Basel III capital
standards. For example, the minimum equity capital requirement as a percentage of
risk-weighted assets is raised from 2% to 4.5%. With the additional requirements for
large institutions, the minimum book equity-to-asset ratio can reach 9.5%.
Critiques of the new requirements warn that the regulation reduces the cost and
the likelihood of bank runs at the expense of lowering bank lending to the real econ-
omy1. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) point out
1For example, Larry Summers voiced this concern in the IMF Conference, November 8, 2013
that “most of what might be done under the aegis of preventing a future crisis would be counter-
productive, because it would, in one way or another, raise the cost of financial intermediation.”
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that in order to limit the moral hazard problem of bankers diverting cash flows away
from investors, who are unable to act as effective monitors, it is optimal for the bank
to be financed with short-term debt so that the banker is subject to the market disci-
pline of runs. This strand of the literature argues that an equity capital requirement
can reduce the associated bankruptcy costs but the investors demand a higher return
on equity to compensate for the greater moral hazard problem, which diminishes the
bank’s ability to raise funds. In another strand of the literature, DeAngelo and Stulz
(2014) and Gorton and Winton (2014) focus on the liquidity premium households
are willing to pay to hold the bank’s short-term debt. A higher equity capital re-
quirement reduces the supply of liquid deposits. Finally, the belief that the equity is
the costliest form of financing and that higher equity capital requirements increase
the overall cost of funding is pervasive in the banking industry.
What capital structure for banks best serves the interests of the real economy? To
address the potential trade-offs between bank lending and the riskiness of the capital
structure, I introduce a model in which the two are jointly determined. In the model,
an owner/manager banker with limited internal funds supplies credit to a long-term
project with uncertain returns. The banker receives a signal of future returns and
can liquidate the project early. He faces two agency problems in raising external
funds: one with the households and another with the outside equity investors. At
the equilibrium, the households hold short-term debt and bank runs occur if there
is a bad expectation of cash flows. I characterize the investment level and the short-
term debt/equity mix that maximize the project’s surplus, and then analyze the
equilibrium in which they are chosen by the utility-maximizing banker.
The paper has two main results. First, there is a unique benchmark investment
level and a corresponding equity-to-investment ratio that lead to the highest surplus
from the project. At this benchmark there is just enough equity in the bank to
absorb the anticipated losses from liquidation so that the short-term debt is risk-
free. Second, if the banker’s internal funds are scarce, the equilibrium features both
a riskier capital structure with too many bank runs and lower investment in the
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project. Therefore, a minimum equity capital requirement to force the banker to
issue outside equity can reduce the likelihood of bank runs and increase investment
at the same time.
Capital structure decisions are concerned with giving the banker the right incen-
tives. The banker and the outside equity investors are better-skilled at monitoring
the cash flows from the project than the households are. The banker cares about
both monetary returns and non-monetary private benefits from allowing projects
to continue. He may want to avoid liquidating bad projects to protect the private
benefits. In this framework short-term debt has a dual disciplining effect on the
banker. First, the banker truthfully reveals his information about the future cash
flow because trying to divert cash flows by announcing them to be low leads to mass
withdrawal resulting in the liquidation of the project and the loss of private bene-
fits. Second, forced liquidations are in accordance with the outside equity investors’
interest if the cash flow from continuing these projects is less than their liquidation
value.
The uniqueness of benchmark capital structure follows from a hump-shaped rela-
tion between the project’s surplus and the equity-to-investment ratio. If the banker
overly relies on short-term debt to finance the investment, the households suffer a
loss whenever the project is liquidated, because the liquidation recovers only a frac-
tion of the investment. For the households to break even in expectation, the banker
pays a compensating premium whenever the project is completed. This premium
determines a threshold below which the banker is insolvent and runs may occur.
The larger the investment and the lower the banker’s equity cushion, the greater the
likelihood that the banker ends up liquidating a high cash flow project at a loss. The
anticipated loss from bank runs depresses the expected return on investment and
lowers the willingness to invest ex ante. Likewise, over-reliance on equity capital is
undesirable because the banker lowers the expected quality of completed projects by
allowing some bad ones to survive for their private benefit. The anticipated drop
in the marginally completed project’s quality also lowers the willingness to invest in
3
the project ex ante.
The banker treats inside and outside equity differently and his preferred capital
structure follows a pecking order: internal funds are preferred to any other external
funding and short-term debt is preferred to outside equity. The banker and the
outside equity investors share the project’s surplus so they both capture rents at
the equilibrium. This feature makes outside equity privately costly for the banker
because the households earn zero rent on their short-term debt. When the internal
funds are scarce, the banker compares the marginal increase in the project’s surplus
to the marginal decrease in the claim on the new surplus. I show that if the rent
is large enough, the banker is better-off leveraging the internal funds by short-term
debt and capturing the entire surplus as the only residual claimant. This insight
remains valid even as the outside equity investors become perfectly competitive and
earn zero rent because the banker’s rent includes private benefits that are reduced
when the controlling interest is diluted with outside equity.
There are no gains from an equity capital requirement if the banker’s internal
funds are abundant. In this case there is no need for outside equity to build the
necessary buffer against liquidation losses. The banker issues risk-free, short-term
debt and only the low cash flow projects are liquidated at the equilibrium. If the
private benefits are small, the unregulated equilibrium obtains the benchmark out-
comes. Requiring an increase in the equity-to-investment ratio leads to excessive
continuation of bad projects, which depresses the investment level.
In my model the motivation for the banker to choose low equity levels come
from the loss of rents on issuing new equity. Much of the recent literature focuses
instead on the role of regulatory frictions leading to excessively risky capital struc-
ture. Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that the banks perceive equity as costly
because bailouts, deposit insurance, and tax shields subsidize short-term debt. Van
den Heuvel (2008); Begenau (2014); Harris, Opp and Opp (2014); and Nguyen (2014)
analyze the optimal bank capital ratios that mitigate the excessive risk-taking in-
centives created by mispriced government guarantees. In contrast, I identify a role
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for capital requirements even if no regulatory friction exists. An insurance/bailout
scheme can be introduced in my model as a policy alternative but it cannot improve
on a correctly set minimum equity capital requirement, because the policymaker does
not observe the banker’s cash flow signal and has to design an incentive-compatible
mechanism2 since the households do not run and discipline the banker once their
claim is insured.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the model, Section 1.3
studies the liquidation rule induced by the capital structure and investment, Section
1.4 analyzes the effect of capital structure on optimal investment level and Section
1.5 presents the unregulated equilibrium outcome. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
1.2 The Model
This section lays out the model economy. After the main assumptions, I de-
termine the benchmark outcomes. Then, I introduce informational and contractual
structure of the model. Last, I provide an intermediate result on short-term debt
and bank runs.
The model has three types of agents: a banker, a continuum of outside investors,
and another continuum of households. There are three periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. All
agents are risk-neutral, protected by limited liability, and do not discount future
gains for simplicity. Opportunity cost of supplying a unit of capital is the same
for all agents. The analysis is concerned with a representative banking relationship
between the three agents. The regulator’s role is suppressed in the baseline model
and all taxes on capital are assumed to be zero.
The real economy in this model is passive. The banker has access to a project
with investment outlay I subject to diminishing returns and a costly real option to
2The bailout literature suggests additional constraints that the policymaker might face, e.g.
the time-inconsistent preferences as in Chari and Kehoe (2013), so the second-best surplus of the
policymaker’s mechanism might be strictly lower.
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liquidate early. The level of investment is chosen at t = 0 and cannot be altered
at later dates. The project yields cash flow zφ(I) at t = 2 for its investors. Here
φ(I) denotes the baseline production function and z is the realization of continuous
random variable Z. At t = 1 the banker observes a non-verifiable signal of z and
this signal perfectly reveals the cash flow at t = 2. At this point the banker can
decide to liquidate the project. Early liquidation at t = 1 recovers a fraction α < 1
of the initial investment I. There are no profitable reinvestment opportunities if the
project’s capital is sold at t = 1. Figure 1.1 illustrates the time line of events.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Financing
Mix
Investment
Level I
Non-verifiable signal of z
Continue
Liquidate
Project completed
zφ(I)
αI
Figure 1.1: The Time Line of Events
I make a standard assumption regarding the production function:
Assumption 1.1 φ : R+ → R+ is strictly concave, strictly increasing and φ(0) = 0.
φ′ is convex and satisfies:
lim
I→0
φ′(I) =∞, lim
I→∞
φ′(I) = 0.
Z has a continuous and differentiable probability density function f on [0,∞)
and F denotes the distribution function. Z satisfies the following condition:
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Assumption 1.2 Z is a log-concave random variable i.e. ln f(z) is concave.
The log-concave family includes commonly used distributions such as Normal,
Exponential, Uniform, Logistic and certain classes of Gamma and Beta. Bagnoli and
Bergstorm (2005) provides a comprehensive list of distributions that satisfy various
log-concavity properties.
1.2.1 The Benchmark
As a benchmark, I show there is a unique investment level and a liquidation rule
that maximize the project’s surplus. For any given I > 0, it is optimal to liquidate
the project at t = 1 if the signal z < z∗(I) where z∗ is determined by
z∗φ(I) = αI (1.1)
The function z∗ gives a liquidation rule which is increasing in I by Assumption
1.1. Taking this liquidation rule as given, denote I∗ as a solution to:
max
I
∫ ∞
z∗
zφ(I)dF (z) + F (z∗)αI − I (1.2)
satisfying the first-order condition:∫ ∞
z∗
zφ′(I)dF (z) + αF (z∗)− 1 = 0 (1.3)
Proposition 1.1. There exists a unique benchmark investment level I∗ ∈ (0,∞).
Absent Assumption 1.2, (1.2) is not a standard problem. For an incremental rise
in investment level, any completed project has lower marginal return by concavity
of φ(I). On the other hand, the expected payoff to completed projects rises because
better projects are completed. Log-concavity of the distribution resolves this ambi-
guity always in favor of diminishing marginal returns. The proof of Proposition 1.1
establishes that (1.2) is quasi-concave in I under Assumption 1.1 and 1.2. In fact
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it is sufficient for Z to have increasing hazard rates, h(z) = f(z)/1− F (z) to be an
increasing function for all z ∈ Z which is weaker than Assumption 1.2, for this result
to hold.
1.2.2 The Governance Problem
I formalize the conflicts of interests between the banker, outside investors, and
households by introducing an information asymmetry and private benefits. The
banker can finance up to a fraction η < 1 of the investment I with internal funding
and the remainder fraction (1 − η) must be financed by issuing claims (external
funding). Here the banker is an owner/manager; I assume his incentives are perfectly
aligned with bank insiders who supply the inside equity for the banker’s use by a
managerial compensation contract that is left out of the analysis.
Households represent the general public, who cannot monitor the banker’s cash
flow. I assume that the banker has superior information about the cash flow at both
t = 1, 2. The banker can divert cash flows away from the households at t = 2 when
they accrue. Therefore, any incentive-compatible contract would require the banker
to reveal his signal at t = 1 and commit to a repayment based on this announcement.
Cash flow announcements are publicly verifiable and the banker is held accountable
if he reneges on his obligations based on what he reported3.
Outside investors represent any other financial institution interested in buying
long-term, non-controlling claims on cash flows. The simplest of such claims is eq-
uity4. They observe and enforce their claim on cash flows without friction. Outside
3One might argue why the regulator does not monitor the banker on behalf of the households.
Although it is true that the banks disclose more substantive information to the regulators, nothing
can be disclosed to the public unless the banker is charged with fraud. Not all forms of diverting
cash flows are fraudulent e.g. reinvesting cash flows through a subsidiary outside the regulator’s
control. I abstract away from legal considerations of what is a fraud by assuming that the discount
rate after t = 2 is infinity so that suing the bank to collect cash flows is not a worthwhile option
for the households. Implementation of the contract requires a minimal regulatory role. Since the
households cannot learn how much the banker actually has, earnings can be overstated at t = 1 and
the banker claims insolvency later at t = 2. All that is necessary is to freeze the asset and impose
a penalty to offset the private benefit.
4I do not consider additional compensation schemes because the outside investor, by assumption,
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investors are passive shareholders in the sense that they value the monetary returns
to their equity taking the banker’s decisions as given. As they are more skilled in-
vestors than the households, I assume that they are in short supply in the economy
and capture some of the project’s surplus as rent, whereas the uninformed households
are perfectly competitive and earn zero rent.
Table 1.1 illustrates a typical balance sheet. Let κ denote the fraction of the
investment financed by equity and a fraction η/κ of this equity is held internally
by the banker. In the baseline model, the inside and outside equity earn the same
payoff per share. That is, the outside equity investors own a (1−η/κ) fraction of the
bank’s equity and they claim (1− η/κ) of the cash flows. Section 1.5.1 analyzes the
limiting case in which the banker can sell outside equity without leaving any rent to
the outside investors.
Table 1.1: Balance Sheet of the Bank
Assets Liabilities
ηI Inside Equity
I (κ− η)I Outside Equity
(1− κ)I Household Claims
A conflict of interest between the banker and the outside investors exists because
they have different preferences. The banker cares about the monetary returns to his
inside equity and derives utility from control rights in the bank. To capture this
idea, the banker receives a non-monetary private benefit proportional to his claim
on cash flows. The smaller the banker’s ownership, the larger the outside investors’
influence in decision-making after t = 2. I take it as an axiom that the banker dislikes
outside interference. For example, the outside investors may impose a different long-
run agenda than the banker wants, alter his compensation contract, or replace him
altogether. Private benefit is lost if the project is liquidated and the banker is fired.
Therefore, the banker has an incentive to complete projects with cash flows lower
is not interested in controlling the bank at t = 0.
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than the liquidation value. I formalize these ideas as follows5:
Private Benefit =

η
κ
×B > 0 if the project survives
0 otherwise
(1.4)
This is well-defined for 0 < η ≤ κ and set the private benefit equal to B if η = κ = 0.
Section 1.5.2 analyzes the case without private benefits which includes η = 0 < κ.
1.2.3 Demandable Debt and Bank Runs
I conclude the model section by proving that the only incentive-compatible claim
the banker can issue to raise funds from uninformed households is demandable debt
and that bank runs can occur at t = 1.
The problem between the banker and the households is mechanically similar to
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) and conceptually similar to Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001). Consider a contract that requires
the banker to announce the future cash flow at t = 1 and gives the right to withdraw
at t = 1. The banker needs to liquidate the project early to meet the demand
for withdrawals. The project cannot be partially liquidated and so let 1B(y) be a
function taking value 1 when the announced state y is in the set B in which some
households withdraw funds. A bank run is defined as an event in which households
exercise the withdraw option en masse. The set B is referred to as bank run states.
The report y at t = 1 is contractible so let R(y) denote the repayment to the
households if a non-bank run state y /∈ B is announced. The equity of any kind is
junior to the claim issued to the households. For a given (I;κ), the households’ claim
is a triplet {(1− κ)I, R(z;κ),B(κ)}, the amount borrowed, repayment function, and
a set of enforced liquidations, respectively.
5In the Appendix, I use a general functional form to illustrate that the insights behind the results
are robust to many other specifications.The proportionality is also desirable for tractability. The
banker’s monetary return to inside equity in the event of completion and liquidation are zφ(I) and
αI times his fractional claim on these cash flows, which is η/κ in the baseline model. If the private
benefit is also proportional to η/κ then the decision is distorted by a constant B.
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Lemma 1.1. The unique incentive-compatible claim the banker can issue to the
households is demandable debt. Households receive a constant repayment R¯(κ) when-
ever the project is completed. If the cash flow is not enough to repay R¯(κ), a bank
run occurs and the project is liquidated.
A flat repayment removes the banker’s incentive to misreport his type as long as
he can repay R¯(κ). For the banker to reveal the truth when z /∈ B(κ), first he must
expect to pay the same amount had he announced a different y /∈ B(κ). Second, the
repayment has to be feasible with the project’s cash flow zφ(I) ≥ R(z;κ). These two
assertions lead to a constant repayment on the complement set of B(κ) – non-bank
run states.
Demandable claims attract uninformed capital by giving an option to threaten
the banker with liquidation. For simplicity of illustration, suppose that η = κ = 0
and the banker is the only residual claimant without private benefits. The banker
is always tempted to offer the liquidation value αI. If the households commit to
withdrawing whenever αI is announced, it would force the banker’s hand to liquidate.
Liquidation makes him worse off even if the project he had were z∗(I) because he
would also lose the private benefit. Pursuing this logic, the threshold below which
households withdraw can be pushed up to a high enough level R¯(κ) to make it
individually rational to buy the claim.
Determining B at t = 0 might appear as if assuming mass pre-commitment to
withdrawal decisions at t = 1. Following Diamond and Rajan (2001), this issue can
be easily resolved by augmenting the claim with a first-come first-served clause on
B(κ) to encourage everyone to be among the first α < 1 to withdraw and redeem I
if the banker announces that he cannot meet the promised repayment R¯(κ). When
strictly less than α fraction withdraws, they disproportionately reduce the liquidation
value αI to be shared among those who wait. When more than α fraction withdraws
simultaneously, each take a random place in the queue to share the liquidation value
among fewer people and those who wait receive nothing. It is easy to see that
withdrawing is the dominant strategy in this game. It is to nobody’s benefit to
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withdraw if the banker announces that he can repay R¯(κ) so I assume the first-come
first-serve clause can be restricted to the set B(κ).
1.3 Equilibrium Liquidation Rule
Taking the investment I and the capital structure decision κ as given, I solve for
the liquidation rule `(I;κ). This rule determines the marginally completed project
which is comparable to the benchmark z∗(I) in (1.1). Figure 1.3 graphically sum-
marizes the key result of this section. The higher the leverage, the more liquidation
takes place at t = 1.
Incentive-compatibility constrains the banker to liquidate at least the projects in
the set B(κ). Yet the statement of Lemma 1.1 leaves it open that not every project
that can repay the debt is necessarily completed. When the project is liquidated,
the households have seniority in claiming the liquidation value αI. So the critical κ∗
to consider is
αI ≡ (1− κ∗)I (1.5)
or simply 1 − α. If κ > 1 − α, then the bank has so much equity that it can repay
the households even in liquidation states. If κ < 1−α, then the converse is true; the
bank has too little equity to spare the households from liquidation loss. Within the
model’s context, the cases κ ≶ 1− α are referred to as under- and over- capitalized
bank, respectively.
1.3.1 Excessive Liquidation When κ < 1− α
Fix I > 0 and let `(κ) denote the marginal project that can repay R¯(κ)
R¯(κ) ≡ `(κ)φ(I) (1.6)
The banker strictly prefers the marginal project to be completed because even
though the payoff to equity is zero, he gets a positive private benefit. When the
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Figure 1.2: Payoffs for a given I > 0
banker completes any project that is not forced into liquidation by a bank run, the
liquidation rule is implicitly given by the households’ participation constraint:
F (`(κ)) αI + (1− F (`(κ)))R¯(κ) ≥ (1− κ)I (1.7)
with equality for each I in a competitive capital market.
The left panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates the payoffs for κ < 1−α. The areas under
the two dashed lines corresponds to the first and second terms in (1.7). For lending
to the bank to be individually rational, households should be paid a premium in the
completion states to compensate the loss (α− (1−κ))I < 0 they make in liquidation
states. The banker pays the premium only if failing to do so is more costly. By mere
observation `(κ) > z∗ is necessary to satisfy (1.7). Hence, some of the projects with
zφ(I) > z∗φ(I) = αI must be liquidated at t = 1. The intuition is that the bank
runs burn surplus to force the banker to pay an interest rate that he would otherwise
never pay.
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The marked triangle in Figure 1.2a is the deadweight loss from bank runs. Not
all liquidations are wasteful; bank runs liquidate all projects z < z∗(I) that would
be liquidated in the benchmark. Excessive liquidations z∗ < z < `(κ) can be viewed
as an externality. Had the banker financed the same investment I with more equity,
the project had more cash flow available to the households in the liquidation states.
Thus, the repayment R¯(κ) for households to break even could be reduced. Less
likely the banker is insolvent and hit by a run, more projects are completed and the
deadweight loss triangle in Figure 1.2a gets smaller.
1.3.2 Excessive Continuation When κ > 1− α
With enough equity, the banker can guarantee households a fixed payoff for all
states of the world without jeopardizing incentive-compatibility. Despite this enticing
outcome, the liquidation rule is given by:
`(κ)φ(I) ≡ max
(
(1− κ)I, αI −B
)
(1.8)
and it is always lower than the benchmark z∗.
Figure 1.2b illustrates why there is a deviation from the benchmark. Consider the
project zφ(I) = (1− κ)I < αI = z∗φ(I). Outside investors are better served if this
project is liquidated because their payoff would be (1−η/κ)(α− (1−κ))I, the share
in profits after the debt is repaid, positive. Yet the banker might have a large private
benefit (η/κ)B > (η/κ)(α− (1− κ))I such that completing the project is appealing
even though it makes nothing for the equity. The earlier discussion insinuates a
benign view of bank runs in terms of forcing bad projects into liquidation. Given
that the private benefit distorts the banker’s incentive to be lenient towards bad
projects, the bank runs prevent excessive continuation.
Proposition 1.2 generalizes the observations made so far and gives a full charac-
terization of the equilibrium liquidation function.
Proposition 1.2. The liquidation rule `(I;κ) is:
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Figure 1.3: Liquidation Rule for a Given I
1. non-increasing in κ for each I: `κ ≤ 0
2. singly crossing the benchmark at 1− α for each I: `(I; 1− α) ≡ z∗(I)
3. increasing in I for each κ: `I > 0
4. submodular in (I;κ): `Iκ ≤ 0
The first two items are visualized in Figure 1.3. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)
obtain a similar result whereby the debt/equity mix can lead to excessive liquidation
or continuation. The third item is analogous to z∗I > 0, better projects survive for a
higher level of investment. For the fourth item, take κL < κH < 1− α and compute
the range of projects that be spared from excessive liquidation: `(I;κL) − `(I;κH).
Submodularity implies that the difference is rising in I. As the size of the bank
grows, the lack of equity cushion leads to more excessive liquidations. A parallel
statement can be made for the benefit of issuing demandable debt when κ is too
high.
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1.4 Investment in the Project
In this section I analyze the investment level and the surplus from the project
for any given capital structure the banker may choose. I show that whenever `(κ)
deviates from the benchmark z∗, both the investment and the surplus from the
project are distorted compared to the benchmark.
Given the liquidation rule `(I;κ), the surplus from the project captured by the
equity-holders is:
S(I;κ) ≡
∫ ∞
`(κ)
(zφ(I)− R¯(κ)) dF (z) + F (`(κ)) max(αI − (1− κ)I, 0)− κI
≡
∫ ∞
`(κ)
zφ(I) dF (z) + F (`(κ))αI − I (1.9)
The foremost two terms in the first line represent the cash flow after debt and the
last term is the opportunity cost of equity capital. The second line substitutes the
value of debt using households’ participation constraint (1.7). After the substitution
(1.9) is directly comparable to the benchmark (1.2).
Two features of S(I;κ) need to be emphasized. First, the banker’s private benefit
is excluded. The aim of this section is to isolate how a given capital structure
affects the willingness to invest in the project and the way the benchmark is defined
implicitly assumes that the social purpose of banking is to maximize the surplus
in the real economy6. Second, since the payoff to the outside equity investors is
proportional to S(I;κ) by their fractional ownership (1 − η/κ), they capture rents
at any equilibrium while the households break even.
The surplus-maximizing investment is denoted IS(κ):
IS(κ) ≡ arg max
I
S(I;κ) (1.10)
6The benchmark is not defined as a problem of a benevolent social planner who cares about the
banker’s private benefit. It is possible to take a firmer stance that the banker’s private benefit is
an uncompensated transfer from the agents in the unmodeled broader economy and not a positive
spillover the policymaker/regulator should internalize.
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The surplus S(I;κ) coincides with the benchmark only if the liquidation rule
`(κ) corresponds to z∗ which occurs at κ = 1− α in Figure 1.3. For any κ 6= 1− α,
there will be an additional term that shifts willingness-to-invest. I study under- and
over-capitalized cases separately.
1.4.1 Under-capitalized Case κ < 1− α
Decompose S such that IS(κ) solves:
max
I
∫ ∞
z∗
zφ(I) dF (z) + F (z∗)αI − I −
∫ `(κ)
z∗
(zφ(I)− αI) dF (z) (1.11)
The last term is the deadweight loss triangle in Figure 1.2a and I∗ maximizes the
rest of (1.11). IS(κ) deviates from I∗ if the marginal deadweight loss
`I(κ)
(
`(κ)φ(I)− αI
)
f(`(κ)) +
∫ `(κ)
z∗
(zφ′(I)− α)dF (z) (1.12)
is non-zero evaluated at I∗.
The first term of (1.12) is unambiguously positive for all I. When investment
rises from I ′ to I ′′, the type `(I ′, κ) < `(I ′′, κ) is inefficiently liquidated at t = 1.
This is a disincentive to invest. The sign of the second term is hard to predict. The
ambiguity stems from diminishing marginal returns, because while payoff levels are
the same z∗φ(I) = αI, the marginals favor liquidation z∗φ′(I) < α. This ambiguity
makes it uncertain whether switching from completing the project z to liquidation,
zφ′(I) − α, would yield to a total marginal gain or loss. It is possible, in principle,
that the banker is content to swap low marginal return projects with α even though
his payoff level is going down. Despite this interesting twist, disincentive to invest
dominates the second effect for all I regardless of its sign.
Proposition 1.3. An under-capitalized bank under-invests in the project: IS(κ) <
I∗.
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Proposition 1.3 proves that the deadweight loss triangle in Figure 1.2a grows
with the investment level. The bigger the size of an under-capitalized bank, the
more wasteful bank runs become. To see why under-investment occurs in a simple
example, consider the following:
Example 1.1. Z ∼ UNIF (0, p) with f(z) = 1/p is log-concave and F (z) = z/p is
linear.
I claim that the first positive term in (1.12), the disincentive to invest, is greater
than the largest negative value of the integral term. To show that, replace the integral
in (1.12) with its lower bound when the integrand is evaluated at z∗ for all z on its
support. Since z∗φ(I) = αI by definition and z∗Iφ(I) + z
∗φ′(I) = α by chain rule,
the marginal deadweight loss is bounded below by:
φ(I)
[
`I(κ)(`(κ)− z∗)f(`(κ))− z∗I
(
F (`(κ))− F (z∗)
)]
= φ(I)
(`(κ)− z∗
p
)
(`I(κ)− z∗I ) > 0 (1.13)
The sign is positive because for κ < 1 − α, Proposition 1.2 proves `(κ) > z∗ and
`Iκ < 0 implies `I(κ) > `I(1− α) = z∗I .
Underinvestment is a typical outcome in asymmetric information models in which
the principal forgoes some surplus to make it incentive-compatible for the agent. Here
the forgone surplus is the high cash flow projects liquidated at a discount. An under-
capitalized bank invests less than the benchmark because the optimal investment
has to trade off maximizing the project’s surplus with the growing cost of excessive
liquidations. Proposition 1.3 does not imply a stronger prediction that investment
always rises in κ. However, since IS(κ) is continuous in κ and bounded above by I∗
which is obtained as the limit IS(κ) → I∗ as κ → 1 − α, the comparative statics
must hold locally. A strong comparative static can be made for the surplus from the
project.
Corollary 1.1. Optimal investment and the resulting surplus from the project are
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positively correlated to the bank’s equity-to-investment ratio.
1. There exists a δ > 0 such that
∀κ ∈ [1− α− δ, 1− α] : IS(κ)↗ κ
2. For all κ < 1− α
S(IS(κ);κ)↗ κ
1.4.2 Over-capitalized Case κ > 1− α
Throughout this subsection, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.3 The private benefit satisfies: E[zφ′(B/α)] > 1
This assumption rules out an unedifying situation in which the private benefit is
so large that the banker completes every project and liquidation never takes place
at the optimum.
Decompose S such that IS(κ) solves:
max
I
∫ ∞
z∗
zφ(I) dF (z) + F (z∗)αI − I −
∫ z∗
`(κ)
(αI − zφ(I)) dF (z) (1.14)
In this case the last term is the cost of excessive continuation to the outside
investors, which is the triangle in Figure 1.2b. To see how the size of the triangle
changes with investment, differentiate it in I to get:
−`I(κ)
(
αI − `(κ)φ(I)
)
f(`(κ)) +
∫ z∗
`(κ)
(α− zφ′(I)) dF (z) (1.15)
Excessive continuation affects the willingness-to-invest through two channels but
contrary to the under-capitalized analogue (1.12), they unambiguously go in opposite
directions. The first term of (1.15) captures the level effect that encourages more
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investment. For an increase from I ′ to I ′′, the type `(I ′, κ) which is inefficiently
completed at t = 1 is instead liquidated with the new and higher threshold `(I ′′, κ).
When the banker is reducing the quality of completed projects, the first response
is to invest more to improve the quality of the marginally completed project. The
second term of (1.15) captures the disincentive to invest. For an incremental rise in
the investment level, the outside investors forgo α − zφ′(I) > 0 on the margin for
each z ∈ [`(κ), z∗]. Figure 1.4 illustrates the two channels for two distributions.
Which effect dominates at the optimum? Unlike the under-capitalized case where
the deadweight loss always grows with investment, here the answer depends on both
the distribution of Z and the level of I. I prove in the next proposition that the cost
of excessive continuation is increasing [decreasing] in I for small [large] I .
Proposition 1.4. For each κ > 1− α there exists a threshold T (κ) such that
1. If T (κ) > I∗, there is under-investment: IS(κ) < I∗
2. If T (κ) < I∗, there is over-investment: IS(κ) > I∗
`(I ′)
`(I ′′)
z∗(I ′)
z∗(I ′′)
z
Probability
(a) Truncated Gaussian
`(I ′)
`(I ′′)
z∗(I ′)
z∗(I ′′)
z
Probability
(b) Exponential
Figure 1.4: Excessive Continuation and Investment I ′ < I ′′
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It is possible to make accurate predictions for specific choices of Z. Recall
Z ∼ UNIF (0, p) in Example 1.1. Following exactly the same steps described be-
fore leads to an increasing cost of excessive continuation. Therefore T (κ)→∞ and
there is under-investment for any κ. Consider a second example:
Example 1.2. Z ∼ EXP (p) with f(z) = pe−pz decreasing and log-concave, F (z) =
1− e−pz increasing and concave.
I claim that as κ → 1 so that the bank is almost exclusively financed by equity,
there is over-investment. Weigh the largest disincentive to invest to the positive level
effect by replacing the integral in (1.15) by the integrand evaluated at `(1) for all z
on its support. The upper bound on (1.15) is
`I(1)φ(I)
[(
F (z∗)− F (`(1))
)
− (z∗ − `(1))f(`(1))
]
≤ 0 (1.16)
Since F is concave, the value at a higher point is bounded above by its first-order
Taylor approximation at a lower point, F (z∗) ≤ F (`(1)) + (z∗ − `(1))f(`(1)), which
proves the cost of excessive continuation is shrinking in I. This example corresponds
to T (κ) = B/α < I∗ by Assumption 1.3 for large enough κ.
It is not possible to accurately predict under- and over-investment when the
probability density of Z is non-monotone, such as Truncated Gaussian in Figure
1.4a, and κ is relatively low so that the optimum occurs on the falling segment of
Figure 1.3. The only unambiguous comparative static in κ is the following:
Corollary 1.2. The surplus from the project S(IS(κ);κ) decreases in κ.
The intuition behind Corollary 1.2 is that when the demandable debt is risk-free,
it plays a desirable disciplining role on the banker to cap excessive continuation.
Therefore, limiting debt issuance does not increase the surplus in any way because
every project liquidated due to insolvency is a low cash flow project that is also
liquidated at the benchmark.
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1.5 The Banker’s Optimal Capital Structure
In this last section I characterize the investment level and the capital structure
of an unregulated equilibrium taking the limit on the banker’s internal funding η as
given. I show that if η < 1− α, the banker’s internal funding is less than necessary
to maximize the surplus from the project, the banker does not issue enough outside
equity to close the gap. Therefore, both the investment and the surplus from the
project increases if the policymaker requires an equity-to-investment ratio of 1− α.
The banker’s utility for a given (I; η, κ) is
U(I; η, κ) ≡ η
κ
(
S(I;κ) + (1− F (`(κ))B
)
=
η
κ
V (I;κ) (1.17)
I have computed the surplus all equity-holders capture in (1.9) denoted by S(I;κ).
The monetary payoff to the banker’s inside equity is proportional to his fractional
ownership η/κ. The second term in (1.17) is the expected private benefits which are
also proportional to the ownership by (1.4).
I refer to V as the banker’s rent. The banker’s utility is decomposed in a way that
the investment maximizes V (I;κ) independent of η. Denote the utility-maximizing
investment by IU(κ).
Proposition 1.5. The banker invests less than the level that maximizes the surplus
from the project ∀κ : IU(κ) < IS(κ)
Higher investment increases the marginally completed project, `I > 0 for every κ,
making it less likely to capture the private benefit ex ante. This intuition would be
true even if the private benefit had positive returns to scale in investment. In that
case, the expected loss of private benefit from higher investment dominates whatever
the marginal increase in private benefit might be for large I. I explore this case in
the Appendix.
Evaluate the banker’s utility (1.17) at the optimal investment IU(κ) so that the
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only choice variable is κ:
U(IU(κ); η, κ) =
η
κ
V (IU(κ);κ) ≡ η
κ
Vˆ (κ) (1.18)
I assume Vˆ (κ) ≥ 0 for all κ so that the banker’s decision is non-trivial. I provide
a key property of Vˆ (κ) to facilitate the analysis.
Lemma 1.2. The banker’s rent Vˆ (κ) is weakly increasing in κ. There exists a
K ∈ (1− α, 1) with
Vˆκ(K) = 0 (1.19)
such that Vˆ (κ) is constant for all κ ≥ K.
Lemma 1.2 yields three intermediate results. First, if the banker had no limits
on internal funding, η = 1, then he would never issue outside equity but he might
issue some demandable debt. Let K ∈ (1 − α, 1) denote the threshold above which
the liquidation rule is constant in Figure 1.3. The debt does not interfere with
the banker’s liquidation decision beyond a threshold because even if the banker is
insolvent, the cash flow from the project is so low that the banker is willing to
liquidate the project despite the private benefit. Second, when the banker’s inside
equity is constrained η ≤ K, he would use all of it before considering external
funding. Third, if the banker issues outside equity when η < K, the total equity
never exceeds K because the rent is constant but the ownership is reduced.
Using the implications of Lemma 1.6 the banker chooses κU ∈ [η,K] to maximize
(1.17). Choosing κU = η means that the banker does not issue outside equity. The
choice critically depends on the size of the maximal rent. The banker’s rent is high
if Vˆ (K) > K or low if Vˆ (K) ≤ K. Note that B can be chosen large enough to
guarantee that the banker’s rent is high.
Proposition 1.6. If the banker’s rent is high, Vˆ (K) > K, then the optimal capital
structure follows a pecking order. Inside equity is preferred to any external funding.
Then demandable debt is preferred to outside equity if external financing is used.
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The proof of this Proposition is simple and instructive so it is presented here.
The banker compares three options: (i) at the lower bound the banker leverages the
inside equity by demandable debt; (ii) at the upper bound the banker capitalizes the
bank up to K to capture the maximum rent; and (iii) a potential interior solution.
The utility from the options (i) and (ii) are respectively Vˆ (η) and ηVˆ (K)/K. For
the third option, differentiate the left-hand side of (1.17) in κ:
(η
κ
Vˆ (κ)
)′
=
η
κ
(
Vˆκ − Vˆ (κ)
κ
)
(1.20)
The banker’s utility is eventually declining since Vˆκ(K) = 0. Suppose there exists
a local interior maximum k′ such that
Vˆκ(k
′) =
Vˆ (k′)
k′
⇐⇒ (ln Vˆ (κ))′
∣∣∣
κ=k′
= (lnκ)′
∣∣∣
κ=k′
(1.21)
or simply Vˆ (k′) = k′. The banker’s utility at the local maximum should be η. By
construction this utility should be larger than the utility at K where it is negatively
sloped. However, η
K
Vˆ (K) > η is a contradiction. Therefore, (1.20) must be negative
for all κ and the unique solution is the lower bound κU = η.
Figure 1.5 plots the banker’s utility for each of the three options as a function
of η. The left panel covers the high-rent case in Proposition 1.6. I have proven the
inequality Vˆ (η)/η > Vˆ (K)/K for any η < K provided that Vˆ (K)/K > 1. Therefore,
the banker’s options can be ranked and not issuing outside equity dominates all
options. I illustrate the low-rent case in Figure 1.5b. Even if the equilibrium surplus
from the project and the private benefit are both small, the banker still does not
issue outside equity if η is low enough.
There are two reasons behind the banker’s preference against issuing outside
equity even if it increases the investment in the project and likelihood of its survival.
One is because the outside investors capture some of the new surplus and the other
is because the private benefit is reduced. I isolate the role played by each in the
next two subsections. A simple way to illustrate the wedge between what is socially
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Figure 1.5: The Banker’s Utility for η < K
desirable and what is privately optimal is by writing the term that determines the
sign of (1.20) as
(κ) ≡ Vˆκ(κ)κ
Vˆ (κ)
(1.22)
I interpret (κ) as the point elasticity of the banker’s rent to new equity capital.
The banker computes whether the increase in his rent is more than enough to com-
pensate the loss of the claim on cash flows. If (1.20) is negative, the elasticity (κ) is
less than unity. When 0 < (κ) < 1, outside equity is privately costly for the banker
and he does not want to issue any. The policymaker wants more equity capital be-
cause he is concerned only with the surplus from the project and indifferent about
how the surplus is distributed between the banker and the outside equity investors.
1.5.1 Perfect Competition among Outside Equity Investors
In this subsection I relax the assumption that the outside equity earn a higher
return than the demandable debt. I show that the equilibrium can still exhibit
under-capitalization and under-investment even though the pecking order result in
Proposition 1.6 does not necessarily hold.
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In the baseline model if the banker owns η/κ of the bank’s equity at t = 0, he
claims η/κ fraction of the cash flows after repaying the debt. This way the banker
offers the same excess return per share that the inside equity earns to the outside
equity investors. Suppose instead that the outside equity investors are perfectly
competitive and the banker offers a new fractional claim on cash flows f for the
outside investors to break-even:
f ×
(∫ ∞
`(κ)
zφ(I)dF (z) + F (`(κ))αI − (1− κ)I
)
= (κ− η)I (1.23)
The right-hand side of (1.23) is the opportunity cost and the parenthetical term is
expected cash flows after debt computed earlier in (1.9). I retain the assumption that
the private benefit is proportional to the banker’s claim on cash flows, therefore 1−f
replaces η/κ in (1.4). With the new specification the banker’s utility maximization
differs from (1.17):
max
I,κ
U(I; η, κ) ≡ S(I;κ) + (1− f)(1− F (`(κ))B (1.24)
If all the capital markets are competitive, the banker captures the entire surplus
from the project S(I;κ) for himself. The only reason a different (I;κ) is chosen is
because of the private benefits. Although f is a complicated function of (I;κ), it is
possible to prove an analogue of Proposition 1.5 that the banker wants to invest less
than the surplus-maximizing level IS(κ) for each κ. However, the optimal κU is no
longer tractable so I provide a sufficient condition instead.
Lemma 1.3. If the banker’s internal funds are scarce η < 1−α, both the investment
level IU and the equity-to-investment ratio κU that solve (1.24) are less than the
benchmark (I∗, 1 − α) if evaluated at IU(κ), the outside investors’ claim on cash
flows is not too small:
lim
κ→1−α
f > lim
κ→1−α
(
− `κ f(`(κ))
1− F (`(κ))(κ− η)
)
(1.25)
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Since the banker extracts more surplus from the project by issuing outside equity,
the only downside is how much ownership he has to give up that reduces the private
benefits. The right-hand side of (1.25) is the threshold above which the private
benefit is more valuable to the banker than the increase in the project’s surplus.
Therefore, even if the banker has some incentive to issue outside equity, he does not
enough have incentive to capitalize up to 1− α provided (1.25) is satisfied.
1.5.2 No Private Benefits
In this subsection I analyze the baseline model without the private benefits by
setting B = 0. The private benefits create a friction at both t = 0 and t = 1.
Without the private benefits, there is no longer excessive continuation at t = 1 when
κ > 1 − α. Therefore, 100% equity capital gets the same benchmark outcome as
1 − α. Then the η ≥ 1 − α case is uninteresting because the banker’s preferences
are perfectly aligned with the policymaker and he does not face an external funding
constraint. I analyze η < 1 − α case and show that the equilibrium again features
an under-capitalized bank with low level of investment.
The banker’s utility (1.17) is modified to
U(I; η, κ) ≡ η
κ
S(I;κ) (1.26)
The banker receives a monetary payoff from the project’s surplus proportional to
his ownership t = 0 and the outside equity investors capture the rest. Since B = 0,
Proposition 1.5 does not apply and the banker’s choice of investment corresponds
to IS(κ) modeled in Section 1.4. Evaluated at IS(κ), Corollary 1.1 shows that the
equilibrium surplus S(IS(κ);κ) is rising in κ until 1− α and constant thereafter, as
argued in the opening paragraph of this subsection. Therefore, the banker chooses
κ ∈ [η, 1−α] to maximize (1.26) evaluated at IS(κ). I get an analogue of Proposition
1.6:
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Lemma 1.4. If the banker’s internal funds are scarce η < 1 − α, then both the
investment level and the equity-to-investment ratio that solve (1.26) are less than the
benchmark (I∗, 1− α).
The derivative of (1.26) in κ evaluated at IS(κ) using the Envelope Theorem is
η
κ
(
Sκ(I
S(κ);κ)− S(I
S(κ);κ)
κ
)
(1.27)
It suffices to show that as κ→ 1− α, the marginal surplus is zero at the maximum
so that the optimal choice κU must satisfy η ≤ κU < 1 − α. Proposition 1.3 proves
IS(κU) < I∗ and completes the proof. It is possible to predict pecking order, κU = η
and no outside equity, if the maximum surplus from the project S(I∗, 1−α) is larger
than 1− α. This is the analogue of Vˆ (K) > K in the statement of Proposition 1.6.
1.6 Conclusion
I have developed a model of bank capital structure and investment to evaluate
the commonly held view that reducing the risk of bank runs with more equity capital
trades off the volume of lending to the real economy. The main results of this paper
suggest the opposite conclusion: a minimum equity capital requirement can make
the bank safer and at the same time, create an incentive to invest more.
In his survey of empirical evidence, Thakor (2014) writes that “in the cross-
section of banks, higher capital is associated with higher lending, higher liquidity
creation, higher bank values and higher probabilities of surviving crisis”. For ex-
ample, Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Kapan and Minoui (2013) find that well-
capitalized banks with a stronger ability to buffer losses cut lending less in response
to a negative shock. My model is consistent with these findings, except for liquidity
creation left outside the model, and can explain why the banks do not increase their
equity capital by themselves.
How should the policymaker set the requirement? This paper offers two insights.
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The requirement depends only on α, the recovery rate of investment but not size-
related parameters η or I, or the distribution F . If the parameter α is interpreted
as a measure of asset liquidity, then the more liquid a bank’s portfolio is, the higher
the leverage the bank can sustain. Recently Brunnermeier et al. (2014) develop a
measure of mismatch between the asset liquidity and the funding liquidity as an al-
ternative prudential tool. My model suggests that this is a more promising approach
than the standard risk-weights. Second, the policymaker can monitor the riskiness
of the bank’s short-term debt instead of tracking α. At the benchmark of my model,
the debt is risk-free. Market signals such as CDS spread on the individual bank’s
debt might reveal how far that bank is away from the benchmark.
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Appendix 1
Lemma 1.5. ∀z¯ : ∂E(Z − z¯|Z > z¯)/∂z¯ = h(z¯)E(Z − z¯|Z > z¯) − 1 ≤ 0 where h is
the hazard function f/(1− F ) of Z.
Proof. E(Z − z¯|z > z¯) is known as the mean residual lifetime function. Bagnoli
and Bergstorm (2005) Theorem 6 proves that a random variable with an increasing
hazard rate has a decreasing mean residual lifetime. Assumption 1.2 guarantees that
the hazard rate is increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Divide the left hand side of (1.3) by 1− F (z∗); the proba-
bility that the project is completed. Rearrange terms to get:
φ′(I)E(Z|Z > z∗)− 1− 1
1− F (z∗)(1− α)F (z
∗) (1.28)
(1.28) has the same sign as the left-hand side of (1.3) and I prove that (1.28)
singly crosses 0 once from above at an interior I∗ which proves that (1.2) is quasi-
concave I with a single peak at I∗. (1.28) is interesting on its own. The term
φ′(I)E(Z|Z > z∗) − 1 is the marginal return from investing a dollar in the project
at t = 0 conditional on the project being completed. The remainder term is the
conditional marginal cost.
Note that z∗ = αI/φ(I) is an increasing function of I by Assumption 1.1 with
limits z∗ → 0 as I → 0 and∞ as I →∞. Evaluate (1.28) as I → 0. Marginal return
goes to infinity and the marginal cost goes to zero and thus (1.28) goes to infinity
as I → 0. To see the limit I → ∞, use the inequality in Lemma 1.5 evaluated at
z∗ and multiply both sides by φ′(I) > 0. Using z∗φ′(I) < α < 1, obtain an upper
bound on the marginal return
φ′(I)E(z|z > z∗)− 1 < φ
′(I)
h(z∗)
(1.29)
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where h is the hazard function.
This upper bound is a decreasing function that converges to 0 as I → ∞. The
marginal cost goes to ∞ as F goes to 1. So (1.28) goes to −∞ as I → ∞. All
terms in the left-hand side of (1.28) are continuous in I so (1.28) crosses 0 at least
once. Let I∗ denote that point. To establish the uniqueness of I∗, I prove that both
marginal return and cost are monotone.
The marginal cost F (z∗)/(1 − F (z∗)) is increasing in I: by chain rule F is in-
creasing in z∗ and z∗ is increasing in I. The slope of marginal return is given by
φ′′(I)E(Z|Z > z∗) + φ′(I)∂E(Z|Z > z
∗)
∂z∗
z∗I (1.30)
The first term is negative and the second is positive so the sign is ambiguous.
However, Lemma 1.5 implies that 0 ≤ ∂E(Z|Z > z∗)/∂z∗ ≤ 1 and by chain rule
z∗I = (α − z∗φ′(I))/φ(I) > 0. Using these two inequalities, (1.30) is bounded from
above by
φ′′(I)E(Z|Z > z∗)− z∗φ
′(I)2
φ(I)
+ α
φ′(I)
φ(I)
< z∗
(
φ′′(I)− φ
′(I)2
φ(I)
)
+ α
φ′(I)
φ(I)
= z∗φ(I)
(
φ′(I)
φ(I)
)′
+ α
φ′(I)
φ(I)
= α
{(
φ′(I)
φ(I)
)′
I +
φ′(I)
φ(I)
}
(1.31)
By Assumption 1.1 φ′(I) and 1/φ(I) are decreasing convex functions so their
product is also decreasing convex. Then φ′(I)/φ(I) satisfies∣∣∣∣(φ′(I)φ(I)
)′∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1I
(
φ′(I)
φ(I)
)
That is, the slope is larger than the average in absolute value. Using this inequality
the upper bound (1.31) is non-positive and therefore, the conditional marginal return
is decreasing. This suffices to conclude that (1.28) single crosses 0 from above at I∗.
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Since their signs are the same, (1.3) is uniquely satisfied at I∗ as well.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Fix any I > 0, the dependence of functions on I is suppressed
throughout. The proof is similar to Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
Incentive-compatibility can be stated in its most general form as for any z
z =
η
κ
× arg max
y
[
1B(κ)(y) max
(
(1− α− κ)I, 0
)
+ (1− 1B(κ)(y)) max
(
zφ(I)−R(y;κ) +B, (1− α− κ)I, 0
)]
(1.32)
The first term captures the liquidation payoff to the banker and the second term
says the banker receives the maximum of completion and liquidation payoffs if there
is no run.
Suppose that κ < 1 − α so the equity gets nothing in liquidation. Since B > 0
and zφ(I) ≥ R(z;κ), (1.32) can be simplified to
z =
η
κ
× arg max
y
(1− 1B(κ)(y))(zφ(I)−R(y;κ) +B)
For any z, z′ /∈ B(κ), it must be that R(z;κ) = R(z′;κ) = R¯(κ) ≤ infy/∈B(κ) yφ(I).
There is no incentive for z /∈ B(κ) to pretend to be y ∈ B(κ) or for a z ∈ B(κ)
to report another y ∈ B(κ). However, z ∈ B(κ) may pretend to be y /∈ B(κ). As
Footnote 3 explains, there is a non-pecuniary penalty at least as large as B in case
the banker reports y which he later fails to repay R(y;κ) at t = 2. So for this
deviation to be unprofitable, it has to be that R¯κ ≥ supy∈B(κ) yφ(I). Putting all
together, R¯(κ) ≡ `(κ)φ(I) such that B(κ) = [0, `(κ)].
Consider now αI > (1 − κ)I or κ > 1 − α. Here there are two sub-cases. First
suppose that αI > (1− κ)I > αI −B. The private benefit is so large that whenever
z /∈ B(κ), the banker is better off completing the project. In this sub-case the proof is
identical to the one above; the only difference is that the liquidation payoff is shifted
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from zero to (1−α−κ)I > 0. Last, suppose that αI > αI−B > (1−κ)I. The steps
behind constant repayment R¯(κ) are identical but in this sub-case there are projects
z /∈ B(κ) that the banker does not want to complete. The run threshold is lower
than the liquidation threshold `(κ) as the latter is defined `(κ)φ(I) − R¯(κ) + B ≡
αI − (1− κ)I and therefore `(κ)φ(I) > R¯(κ).
Pinning down `(κ) is simpler in either sub-case of κ > 1− α. The equation
F (`(κ))(1− κ)I + (1− F (`(κ)))R¯(κ) = (1− κ)I
holds when R¯(κ) = (1−κ)I. If (1−κ)I > αI−B, then `(κ)φ(I) = (1−κ)I. Otherwise
`(κ)φ(I) = αI −B for all κ. Put together `(κ)φ(I) = max((1− κ)I, αI −B).
A Note on the General Functional Form for Private Benefits
Suppose instead the private benefit has a general functional form B(I, η, κ). As
long as B function is positive, the proof is identical for κ ≤ 1 − α. In κ > 1 − α
case the R¯(κ) = (1 − κ)I result is also identical; if the banker can repay the face
value in both liquidation and completion, he never compensates the households more
regardless of how his private benefits work. The only change would be the liquidation
rule is replaced by
κ > 1− α : `(κ) = max
(
(1− κ)I, αI − κ
η
B(I;κ, η)
)
(1.33)
Proof of Proposition 1.2. I prove `κ ≤ 0, `I > 0, `Iκ ≤ 0 for κ < 1− α first and then
repeat the proofs for κ > 1 − α. The single crossing at 1 − α follows immediately
from the first assertion together with `(0) > z∗ > `(1) which is proved in the text.
R¯(κ) and `(κ) are determined by households’ participation constraint (1.7) in the
text. Define H(`) : [z∗,∞)→ R by
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H(`) ≡ F (`)αI + (1− F (`))`φ(I)− (1− κ)I (1.34)
and H(`(κ)) = 0 corresponds to the equilibrium solution. The lower bound is z∗
because the lowest the banker can pay out to the households is αI which is less than
what he owes (1− κ)I. So at the lower bound H(z∗) < 0. Differentiate H(`) to get
H ′(`) = (φ(I)− (`φ(I)− αI)h(`))(1− F (`)) (1.35)
The sign of H ′(`) is determined by φ(I) − (`φ(I) − αI)h(`). Since z∗φ(I) =
αI, lim`→z∗ H ′(`) > 0. The hazard rate h(`) is increasing by Assumption 1.2, so
φ(I) − (`φ(I) − αI)h(`) is a decreasing function of ` with limit −∞ as ` goes to
infinity. Therefore there is a unique interior maximum of H at `max > z∗ such that
H ′(`max) = 0. The banker can never raise capital from households if H(`max) ≤ 0.
Otherwise there exists a unique `(κ) < `max such that H(`(κ)) = 0 at which H is
positively sloped H ′(`(κ)) > 0.
Use the implicit function theorem to get
`κ = − I
H ′(`(κ))
< 0 (1.36)
and
`I = −F (`(κ))α + (1− F (`(κ)))`(κ)φ
′(I)− (1− κ)
H ′(`(κ))
(1.37)
where H ′(`(κ)) > 0. To sign the nominator of (1.37), first divide both sides of (1.7)
by I > 0 to write F (`)α + (1 − F (`))`φ(I)/I = (1 − κ). By strict concavity of φ,
φ(I)/I > φ′(I). This suffices to show that the nominator is negative and thus the
sign of (1.37) positive.
To prove submodularity, differentiate (1.36) to get:
`Iκ = −
[ 1
H ′(`(κ))
− H
′′(`(κ))`II
H ′2(`(κ))
]
(1.38)
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The only previously unstudied term in (1.38) is H ′′(`(κ)). H ′(`) is defined in
(1.35) as a product of two decreasing functions. The second is always positive, the
first decreasing function alternates sign but I have proved that it is positive at the
optimum `(κ). This suffices to argue that H ′′(`(κ)) < 0. All other terms in the
square bracket of (1.38) are positive and therefore the overall sign is negative.
Proving these assertions for κ > 1−α is easier since `(κ)φ(I) = max((1−κ)I, αI−
B) gives an explicit function in (I;κ). If (1− κ)I > αI −B then `κ = −I/φ(I) < 0.
In the other sub-case, `(κ)φ(I) = αI −B so ` is independent of κ and `κ = 0.
In either sub-case `(κ) is increasing in I since I/φ(I) is increasing by strict con-
cavity of φ(I). Finally if (1 − κ)I > αI − B, then `Iκ = −
(
I
φ(I)
)′
< 0 and in the
other subcase it is trivially submodular in (I;κ) as it does not depend on κ.
A Note on the General Functional Form for Private Benefits
I derived the liquidation rule for a general functional form for private benefits in
(1.33). The only change in results is in κ > 1− α case. Add a restriction
∂
∂κ
(
κB(I; η, κ)
)
= κBκ +B ≥ 0 (1.39)
which is an elasticity condition. If in addition limκ→1(αI − κηB(I;κ, η)) > 0, then
once more there exists a unique κ′ > 1 − α such that the liquidation rule does not
depend on B function for κ ≤ κ′ and I can only focus on κ > κ′. Under the premise
of (1.39), `κ ≤ 0. The restriction for `I ≥ 0 is another elasticity condition
∂
∂I
(B(I; η, κ)
φ(I)
)
≤ 0⇒ BI
B
≤ φ
′(I)
φ(I)
(1.40)
For `Iκ ≤ 0 to go through, a third and the last restriction is
BIκB ≤ BκBI (1.41)
The baseline form (1.4) satisfies all the restrictions: (1.39) always holds with equality
and BI = BIκ = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3. The arguments of functions ` and z∗ are suppressed through-
out the proof. The optimality condition is∫ ∞
z∗
zφ′(I)dF (z)+F (z∗)α−1−
∫ `
z∗
(zφ′(I)−α)dF (z)−`I(`φ(I)−αI)f(`) = 0 (1.42)
The first three terms correspond to (1.3) and Proposition 1.1 shows that its limit
is ∞ as I → 0. The last two terms are the marginal loss. ` is implicitly defined by
(1.7). Both ` and z∗ go to 0 for I → 0 and the marginal loss disappears. Thus the
left hand side of (1.54) evaluated as I → 0 is ∞.
The last term of the marginal loss is unambiguously positive but the sign of the
integral component is unknown in general. I now prove that it is bounded below by
zero. A lower bound is proposed in the text (1.13). This lower bound requires a
precise relationship between `I to z
∗
I that I obtain from (1.7).
F (`)αI + (1− F (`))`φ(I) = (1− κ)I
F (`)z∗ + (1− F (`))` = (1− κ) I
φ(I)
=
1− κ
α
z∗
F (`)z∗I + (1− F (`))`I − `I(`− z∗)f(`) =
1− κ
α
z∗I (1.43)
Now rewrite the lower bound as
φ(I)
[
− z∗I (F (`)− F (z∗)) + `I(`− z∗)f(`)
]
(1.44)
= φ(I)
[
(1− F (`))`I −
(1− κ
α
− F (z∗)
)
z∗I
]
(1.45)
and thus the lower bound is non-negative if
`I
z∗I
≥ (1− κ)/α− F (z
∗)
1− F (`) (1.46)
Notice that while Proposition 1.2 proves that the ratio of two derivatives is larger
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than unity, the right-hand-side of (1.46) is strictly larger than unity. The exact ratio
can be inferred from (1.43).
`I
z∗I
=
(1− κ)/α− F (`)
1− F (`)− (`− z∗)f(`) =
(1− κ)/α− F (z∗)− (F (`)− F (z∗))
1− F (`)− (`− z∗)f(`) (1.47)
To simplify notation, let the letters a through d denote:
a = (1− κ)/α− F (z∗) , b = 1− F (`) , c = F (`)− F (z∗) , d = (`− z∗)f(`)
All letters are positive. I now claim that
`I
z∗I
=
a− c
b− d >
a
b
(1.48)
which is the sufficient condition (1.46) to prove that the lower bound is non-negative.
(1.48) is equivalent to a/b ≥ c/d. There are two cases for F being convex/concave
on [z∗, `]. If F is convex on that interval:
a
b
=
(1− κ)/α− F (z∗)
1− F (`) >
1− F (z∗)
1− F (`) > 1 ≥
F (`)− F (z∗)
(`− z∗)f(`) =
c
d
(1.49)
As observed at the beginning of the proof, the lower bound is easily signed in the
convex portion of F , if any. If F is concave on [z∗, `], then
a
b
=
(1− κ)/α− F (z∗)
1− F (`) >
1− F (z∗)
1− F (`) ≥
f(z∗)
f(`)
≥ F (`)− F (z
∗)
(`− z∗)f(`) =
c
d
(1.50)
The middle inequality is increasing hazard rate and the last one is the concavity
of F . Lastly, suppose that F is convex at z∗ and concave at ` such that F (`) −
F (z∗) > (` − z∗) max(f(`), f(z∗)). Then there must exists z¯ ∈ (z∗, `) such that
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F (`)− F (z∗) = (z¯ − z∗)f(z¯) and
a
b
>
1− F (z∗)
1− F (`) >
1− F (z¯)
1− F (`) ≥
f(z¯)
f(`)
>
(z¯ − z∗)f(z¯)
(`− z∗)f(`) =
F (`)− F (z∗)
(`− z∗)f(`) =
c
d
(1.51)
This exhausts all cases an arbitrary investment level I can map onto a convex-
concave distribution function F via functions ` and z∗ and in all of them the marginal
loss is bounded above zero. So the left-hand-side (1.42) evaluated at I∗ must be
negative and this suffices to argue that (1.42) is satisfied at a lower IS(κ) < I∗,
concluding the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. The first part of the corollary is proven in the text. The
second part is an application of Envelope Theorem. The function S(IS(κ);κ) is a
well-defined continuous function of κ by Proposition 1.3. Differentiate in κ to get
Sκ(I
S(κ);κ) =
(
SI
∣∣∣
(IS(κ),κ)
∂IS
∂κ
+Sκ
∣∣∣
(IS(κ),κ)
)
= −`κ(κ)
(
`(κ)φ(IS(κ))−αIS(κ)
)
> 0
(1.52)
The first term vanishes at the optimum and the second term is positive by Proposition
1.2.
Lemma 1.6. For i ∈ {S, U} there exists Ki ∈ (1− α, 1) such that at the optimum
αI i(κ)−B R (1− κ)I i(κ) for κ R Ki (1.53)
Proof of Lemma 1.6. I present the proof for IS, the steps are identical for IU . The
critical investment level is B/(κ− (1−α)). The claim is IS(κ) single crosses B/(κ−
(1 − α)) from below. IS(κ) starts from below because as κ → 1 − α, IS = I∗ <
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limκ→1−αB/(κ − 1 − α) = ∞. The critical level B/(κ − (1 − α)) is decreasing
and convex in κ with lower limit B/α. Suppose for some κL < κH , IS(κL) ≥
B/(κL − 1 − α). Then for all I ≥ B/(κL − (1 − α)) > B/(κH − (1 − α)), the
thresholds are identical `(I;κL) = `(I;κH) as `φ(I) = αI − B is independent of
κ. Therefore the optimal investments must be identical. This implies that if IS(κ)
crosses B/(κ− (1− α)) once, it is constant in κ thereafter.
Take κ = 1. For I < B/α, `(I; 1) = 0 so the left-hand-side of (1.54) collapses to
E[zφ′(I)]− 1. By Assumption 1.3, E[zφ′(B/α)]− 1 > 0 and φ′′ < 0 so the optimal
investment has to be larger than B/α. Hence there exists KS ∈ (1− α, 1) such that
∀κ ≥ (>)KS : IS(κ) = B
KS − (1− α) ≥ (>)
B
κ− (1− α)
independent of κ, whereas for all κ < KS : `(κ)φ(IS(κ)) = (1− κ)IS(κ).
Proof of Proposition 4. The arguments of functions ` and z∗ are suppressed though-
out. The optimality condition is∫ ∞
z∗
zφ′(I)dF (z) + F (z∗)α− 1−
∫ z∗
`
(α− zφ′(I))dF (z) + `I(αI − `φ(I))f(`) = 0
(1.54)
Once more the first three terms correspond to the benchmark problem and the
last two terms, the first of which is negative and the second is positive, represent the
marginal loss. For κ > 1− α, the liquidation rule is `φ(I) = max(αI −B, (1− κ)I).
As I → 0 the marginal loss becomes zero and Proposition 1.1 proves that the rest of
the terms tend to ∞. The aim is to sign the marginal loss
−`I(αI − `φ(I))f(`) +
∫ z∗
`
(α− zφ′(I)) dF (z) (1.55)
Let ζ be the unique mode of Z by log-concavity. I proceed case-by-case.
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Case 1.1. `(I) < z∗(I) ≤ ζ i.e. F is convex on the interval [`(I), z∗(I)].
(1.55) is bounded below by
LB(I;κ) ≡ −`I(z∗ − `)φ(I)f(`) + (α− z∗φ′(I))(F (z∗)− F (`))
= φ(I)
[
z∗I (F (z
∗)− F (`))− `I(z∗ − `)f(`)
]
≥ 0 (1.56)
The lower bound LB(I;κ) is non-negative as z∗I ≥ `I by Proposition 1.2 and
F (z∗)− F (`) ≥ (z∗ − `)f(`) by convexity of F .
Case 1.2. z∗(I) > `(I) ≥ ζ or F is concave on the interval [`(l), z∗(I)], and κ ≥ K
defined in Lemma 1.6.
Whenever F is concave on an interval, the lower bound (1.56) has an ambiguous
sign. Using Lemma 1.6 (1.55) can be bounded above by
UBκ≥K(I;κ) = φ(I)`I
[
F (z∗)− F (`)− (z∗ − `)f(`)
]
≤ 0 (1.57)
It is redundant to analyze I ≤ B/α since IS(κ) > B/α so totally differentiate
`φ(I) = αI−B > 0 and replace α−`φ′(I) to simplify the expression. The inequality
follows from concavity of F .
Case 1.3. z∗(I) > `(I) ≥ ζ or F is concave on the interval [`(l), z∗(I)], and κ < K
defined in Lemma 1.6.
Neither the lower nor the upper bound can be unambiguously signed in this case.
Define
z∗/` = α/(1− κ) = λ > 1 (1.58)
and observe that the equality also holds for the ratio of their derivatives z∗I/`I . Now
the lower bound (1.56) can be rewritten
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LBκ<K(I;κ) ≡ `Iφ(I)
[
λ(F (λ`))− F (`))− (λ− 1)`f(`)
]
= `Iφ(I)(1− F (`))
[
λ(1− 1− F (λ`)
1− F (`) )− (λ− 1)`h(`)
]
(1.59)
Increasing hazard rate implies that 1 − F (λ`)/1 − F (`) is a decreasing function
of its argument, which is itself increasing in I. Therefore the first term in the square
brackets of (1.59) is an increasing function of I ranging (0, λ). The second term
is increasing in I ranging (0,∞) by the very same assumption. Hence there exists
an I¯1 such that LB
κ<K(I;κ) < 0 whenever I > I¯1. To prove it starts positive,
F (λ`)− F (`) ≥ (λ− 1)`f(λ`) by concavity of F so the lower bound itself satisfies
LBκ<K(I;κ) ≥ `Iφ(I)(λ− 1)`
[
λf(λ`)− f(`
]
(1.60)
Notice that the square bracket term is ∂
(
F (λ`) − F (`)
)
/∂`. Under the log-
concavity assumption, this derivative alternates sign from positive to negative once.
Claim 1.1. For any λ > 1, F (λz)− F (z) is unimodal at ζ¯ ≥ ζ.
The claim proves that the lower bound starts positive, crosses zero at some Iˆ1
and remains negative thereafter. I conclude without loss of generality that
LBκ<K(I;κ) ≷ 0⇐⇒ I ≶ I¯1
The same analysis can be repeated for the upper bound:
UBκ<K(I;κ) ≡ LBκ<K(I;κ) + z∗φ′(I)(F (z∗)− F (`)))
= LBκ<K(I;κ) +
αIφ′(I)
φ(I)
(F (λ`)− F (`)) (1.61)
Whenever LBκ<K(I;κ) ≤ 0, I have argued that ∂
(
F (λ`) − F (`)
)
/∂` ≤ 0. In
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addition, φ(I)/I ≥ φ′(I) by concavity of φ(I). Therefore the additional term in
(1.61) is less than or equal to α(F (λ`)−F (`)), a decreasing function that converges
to 0 as I →∞. This suffices to conclude that ∃I¯2 > I¯1 such that
UBκ<K(I;κ) ≷ 0⇐⇒ I ≶ I¯2
Put together, the marginal loss is positive for small I ≤ I¯1 and negative for large
I ≥ I¯2 so there must exist a threshold T : I¯1 < T < I¯2 such that (1.55) is zero. I
assume without loss of generality that it singly crosses zero.
All cases are covered for κ > 1 − α, in each case there exists T (κ) such that if
I∗ < T (κ), the benchmark is in the increasing segment of marginal loss and therefore
IS(κ) < I∗. Otherwise if I∗ > T (κ) so that the benchmark is in the decrasing segment
of marginal loss, then IS(κ) > I∗. The proof of Claim 1.1 is presented below.
Proof of Claim 1.1. The proof of this claim uses the following result. See Ramos and
Diaz (2001) for a proof.
Result 1.1 (Theorem 1.C.29 in Shaked and Shantikumar (2007)). Let Z be a non-
negative, absolutely continuous random variable with density function f(z) on (0,∞).
λZ likelihood ratio-dominates Z for all λ > 1 if and only if f(ez) is log-concave.
The slope of F (λz) − F (z) is λf(λz) − f(z). Let ζ denote the mode of Z such
that f ′(z) ≷ 0 whenever z ≶ ζ. Consider first z < ζ. Since F ′′(z) = f ′(z) this is the
convex portion of F . Now the slope can be unambiguously signed as f(λz) ≥ f(z)
and λ > 1.
Suppose z ≥ ζ so that F is concave at z or f ′(z) ≤ 0. Notice that if f(z)
is the probability density of Z at point z, then g(z) = f(z/λ) is the probability
density of λZ. By Result 1.1 f(z/λ)/f(z) is increasing, or equivalently f(λz)/f(z)
is decreasing, if and only if f(ez) is log-concave. I now claim that for z ≥ ζ, f(ez) is
log-concave.
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(ln f(ez))′′ = ez
f ′(ez)
f(ez)
+ e2z
(f ′(ez)
f(ez)
)′
≤ 0 (1.62)
The non-positive sign follows from the fact that f ′(ez) ≤ 0 as ez is an increasing
function of z so ez > z ≥ ζ and the second is log-concavity of f(z). Likelihood ratio
order is preserved under integration, therefore
f(λz)
f(z)
↘ z =⇒ F (λz)
F (z)
↘ z =⇒ F (λz)
F (z)
− 1 > λf(λz)
f(z)
− 1 (1.63)
The second inequality completes the proof. The limit of left-hand side is 0 since
limz→∞ F (λz) = limz→∞ F (z) = 1 and therefore λf(λz)/f(z) must be below1 as
z → ∞. The ratio of densities is decreasing in z so either it single crosses 1 from
above or it is always below 1. In either case ∃ζ¯ ≥ ζ such that λf(λz) − f(z) single
crosses 0 from above at ζ¯. This proves that F (λz)−F (z) is increasing for z ≤ ζ¯ and
decreasing for z ≥ ζ¯ concluding the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1.2. The derivative of S(IS(κ);κ) in κ using envelope theorem is
Sκ(I
S(κ);κ) =
(
SI
∣∣∣
(IS(κ),κ)
∂IS
∂κ
+ Sκ
∣∣∣
(IS(κ),κ)
)
= −`κ(κ)
(
`(κ)φ(IS(κ))− αIS(κ)
)
(1.64)
When κ > 1 − α, the parenthetical term is negative. `κ(κ) ≤ 0 by Proposition
1.2 concludes that the derivative is non-negative.
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Proof of Proposition 1.5. By definition in (1.17), IU must satisfy VI(I
U ; η, κ) = 0
and Proposition 1.3 and 1.4 proves ∃ IS that satisfies SI(IS;κ) = 0. Then
VI(I
S; η, κ) =
η
κ
(
SI(I
S;κ)−f(`(κ))`I(IS;κ)B
)
= −η
κ
f(`(κ))`I(I
S;κ)B < 0 (1.65)
since limI→0 VI(I;κ, ξ) → ∞ as limI→0 SI(I;κ) → ∞, there exists IU(κ) < IS(κ)
that satisfies the optimality condition.
Consider a general form for private benefits B(I; η, κ) such that BI ≥ 0 and the
condition (1.40) that is sufficient for all earlier results to hold. The marginal effect
of I on the expected private benefit would be
−f(`(κ)`IB + (1− F (`(κ))BI = (1− F (`(κ))BI
(
1− h(`(κ))`I B
BI
)
The parenthetical term determines the sign and is bounded above by 1−h(`(κ))`Iφ(I)/φ′(I).
It starts positive as I → 0 and since hazard rate h and φ/φ′ are increasing with limit
infinity, it crosses zero and stays negative provided `I is also well-behaved. Let I¯
denote the crossing point. Proposition 1.5 is valid as long as IS(κ) > I¯.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Compute the marginal rent in κ using Envelope Theorem:
Vˆκ =
(
VI
∣∣∣
(IU (κ),κ)
+ Vκ
∣∣∣
(IU (κ),κ)
)
= −`κ
(
`(κ)φ(IU(κ)) +B − αIU(κ)
)
≥ 0 (1.66)
In Lemma 1.6 I proved that there exists a K such that for κ < K the optimum
satifies
`(κ)φ(IU) > αIU(κ)−B
and by Proposition 1.2 `κ < 0 whenever this is the case. Therefore Vˆκ is positive for
κ < K and zero for κ ≥ K.
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Proof of Lemma 1.3. First I show that IU(κ) < IS(κ) for all κ where IS(κ) max-
imizes S(I;κ) and IU(κ) maximizes (1.24). Since 1 − F (`(κ)) is decreasing in I
with the slope −f(`(κ))`I(κ) < 0, I study the sign of ∂f/∂I and prove it is positive
evaluated at IS(κ). Differentiate f is I to get
∂f
∂I
≡ ∂
∂I
( (κ− η)I
S(I;κ) + κI
)
=
κ− η
S(I;κ) + κI
(
1− (SI(I;κ) + κ)I
S(I;κ) + κI
)
(1.67)
Evaluated at IS(κ) the derivative inside the parenthesis vanishes and the remaining
terms are unambiguously positive. Therefore:
UI(I
S(κ); η, κ) = SI(I
S(κ);κ) +
∂
∂I
(
(1− f)(1− F (`(κ))B
)∣∣∣
IS(κ)
< 0 (1.68)
I have proven in Proposition 1.3 that I → 0, SI(I;κ)→∞. Then UI(I; η, κ) equals
zero for some IU(κ) < IS(κ).
For the second part of the result, evaluate (1.24) at IU(κ) and use Envelope
Theorem to get
Uκ(I
U(κ); η, κ) = −`κ
(
`(κ)φ(IU(κ))−αIU(κ) + (1− f)B
)
f(`(κ))− fκ(1−F (`(κ))B
(1.69)
The term fκ denotes the derivative of f in κ evaluated at I
U(κ). To compute this
derivative, first I get:
∂f
∂κ
≡ ∂
∂κ
( (κ− η)I
S(I;κ) + κI
)
=
I
S(I;κ) + κI
(
1− (Sκ(I;κ) + I)(κ− η)
S(I;κ) + κI
)
(1.70)
Consider κ→ 1−α. Since `(κ)→ z∗ and by definition of z∗ in (1.1), limκ→1−α Sκ(I;κ) =
0 for all I. Now ∂f/∂κ simplifies to
lim
κ→1−α
∂f
∂κ
=
f
1− α− η (1− f) (1.71)
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for all I. Likewise the limit of Uκ simplifies to
lim
κ→1−α
Uκ(I
U(κ); η, κ) = lim
κ→1−α
(1− f)B
(
− `(κ)f(`(κ))− f
κ− η (1− F (`(κ))
)
< 0
(1.72)
under condition (1.25). Therefore, even if limκ→η Uκ > 0 so that the banker has an
incentive to issue outside equity, he does not have enough incentive to capitalize up
to 1− α.
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Chapter 2
Savings Portfolio Problem with
Collateralized Debt1
2.1 Introduction
One of the striking developments of the Great Recession of 2008–9 was the rise
and fall of household leverage before and after the Financial Crisis. For instance, Jus-
tiniano et al (2013) report that the ratio of mortgages to GDP rose an unprecedented
30 percentage points in the period 2000-2007 and declined 10 percentage points after
the crisis. This has often been cited as a contributing factor to the severity and
duration of the Great Recession. In fact, the fraction that the households put down
in buying homes has steadily fallen during 1981-2007 except briefly around the 2001
stock market crash.
This paper seeks insights into this trend, by introducing a simple partial equi-
librium model of household portfolio and leverage. One antecedent of this paper is
Geanakoplos (2003, 2010), who explores a rich general equilibrium environment with
endogenous leverage and belief disagreement. In his two-state model, the loans are
collateralized for the worst state and because default happens only at the worst state,
1This chapter presents joint work with Lones A. Smith
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there is no value-at-risk at the equilibrium. Simsek (2013) addresses this problem
but preserves the risk-neutrality assumption. His agent does not hold any risk-free
asset and the relationship between the demand for the risky asset and leverage is
therefore mechanically dictated by the budget constraint.
I generalize Simsek (2013), exploring the portfolio problem of a risk-averse agent
with one risky and a risk-free asset. I assume that he may borrow against the risky
asset, using it as collateral on the loan. Unlike Simsek (2013), there are wealth effects
on the optimal leverage decision. As in Geanakoplos, belief disagreement about the
asset values creates gains from trade between optimistic borrowers and competitive
lenders. Given the competitive assumption, when the agent makes a bigger down
payment, she secures a lower interest on the loan because the lender assumes less
risk. If the promised payment on the loan exceeds the asset value, the agent defaults
and consumes her risk-free savings, while the lender seizes the asset as collateral.
This framework captures a typical household portfolio decision with real estate and
mortgage.
The agent optimally chooses both the portfolio allocation and its leverage ratio.
As a result, belief disagreement in the credit market leads to a more leveraged port-
folio with more of both risky and risk-free assets, compared to the standard portfolio
problem without collateralized borrowing. I also uncover a complementarity between
the agent’s demand for the risky asset and the optimally chosen leverage. For ex-
ample, the agent prefers to make a smaller down payment if risky assets figure more
prominently in his portfolio. Conversely, the demand for the risky asset is higher
with more leverage (a lower loan margin). This complementarity induces to a key
comparative statics result: a more optimistic agent buys more risky asset with bigger
credit. Provided the agent’s beliefs about the asset value arise from a business cycle,
I predict that the household leverage ratio is pro cyclical.
My approach to leverage cycles differs from the credit cycles literature that follows
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In that paper, the agent faces a collateral constraint that
limits the borrowing capacity by a fraction of the collateral value. This requirement
48
amplifies the real effect of a drop in asset values by making it harder the borrow
against low-value collateral. This mechanism has appeared in Eggertsson and Krug-
man (2012), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and Midrigan and Phillippon (2011),
who introduce credit supply shocks to the collateral constraint to study changes in
household debt. In my model, the margin is an endogenous collateral constraint
determined by both the agent’s demand for credit and the lenders’ supply of it. my
agent optimally curbs his credit demand in response to a negative shock to asset val-
ues. By contrast, their agents are forced to de-leverage by the lender’s unwillingness
to supply credit, which can be addressed by the monetary authority by increasing
liquidity for the lender.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 shows
how the endogenous choice of margin changes the standard portfolio problem, Sec-
tion 4 presents the solution to the decision problem, and Section 5 presents the
comparative statics result.
2.2 The Model
In this section I lay out the preliminary assumptions and formalize the decision
problem. There is only one period, the decision is made at the beginning and the
payoff is realized at the end. The agent is endowed with initial wealth w > 0 and
derives utility solely from her ending wealth W . She allocates her initial wealth
between one risky and one risk-free asset neither of which can be sold short. The
price of the risky asset is normalized to unity. Let x ≥ 0 denote the investment in
the risky asset. Each unit of the asset yields a dollar payoff s ≥ 0 at the end of the
period. This is the source of all uncertainty in the model, so ex ante is denoted S.
The risk-free asset earns a known gross return Rf .
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2.2.1 Preferences
The agent is risk-averse. Let u : R→ R∪ {−∞} be a strictly increasing, contin-
uous, differentiable and strictly concave utility function on {u > −∞} representing
the agent’s preferences. Negative wealth is not allowed: u(W ) = −∞ whenever
W < 0. At the extreme wealths, the marginal utility satisfies
lim
W→∞
u′(W ) = 0 , lim
W→0
u′(W ) =∞
I restrict the agent’s risk aversion in the following ways. Let A and R denote the
coefficient of absolute and relative risk aversion respectively,
A(W ) = −u
′′(W )
u′(W )
, R(W ) =
−Wu′′(W )
u′(W )
(2.1)
Assumption 2.1 Absolute risk aversion is non-increasing: A′(W ) ≤ 0, and relative
risk aversion is non-decreasing: R′(W ) ≥ 0.
2.2.2 Borrowing and Lending
There is a continuum of identical and risk-neutral lenders willing to finance the
risky asset with simple debt contracts. All borrowing in this economy has to be
backed by collateral. I model the collateral constraints similar to Geanakoplos (2003,
2010) and Simsek (2013). Lenders offer a menu of contracts specifying per unit
investment: (1) the fraction put down by the agent at the beginning of the period,
denote m for margin, (2) the promised payment at the end of the period, denote i
for gross interest. In this specification x(1−m) is the size of the loan, xi is the total
interest payment on the loan, the implied interest rate is
ι =
i
1−m (2.2)
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and the agent’s leverage ratio is 1/m. All loans are non-recourse; if the risky asset is
worth less than I, the agent can walk away and the lenders foreclose the risky asset
but they are not allowed to seize the agent’s risk-free asset.
2.2.3 Beliefs
The lenders and the agent have different beliefs about the distribution of S and
they agree to disagree about it. In particular, the agent’s optimism measure (θ)
exceeds the lenders’s (0). Let f(s|θ), f(s|0) denote two continuous and differentiable
probability density functions of subjective beliefs on full support [0,∞). F (s|θ) and
F (s|0) denote the cumulative distribution functions.
Assumption 2.2 The cumulative distribution function of the agent’s beliefs F (s|θ)
is log-concave.
Log-concavity of the distribution function is a mild assumption; in addition to
all random variables with a log-concave density, e.g. Normal, Exponential, Uniform,
it includes random variables such as Pareto and Log-Normal with log-convex and
mixed density respectively2.
The expectation of the subjective beliefs are such that
E[S|θ] > Rf > E[S|0] (2.3)
Subjective beliefs represent the different preferences towards the risky asset. The
agent is the natural buyer of the asset and the lenders are not interested unless the
agent is willing to contribute towards the purchase.
More generally, the beliefs are ranked in the likelihood ratio order for any θH > θL:
f(s|θH)
f(s|θL) ↗ s (2.4)
2See Bagnoli and Bergstorm (2005) for a comprehensive list of log-concavity properties of com-
monly used distributions.
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or f(s|θ) is log-supermodular in (s, θ).
2.2.4 Margin-Interest Menu of Loans
With a competitive supply of lenders, each lenders must earn zero profit on each
loan. That is, (m, i) must satisfy:
E[min(S, i)|0] = (1−m)Rf (2.5)
The right-hand side is the expected payoff from lending against one unit of risky
asset promising i in return. Since the agent puts down m for that one unit, the
left-hand side is the opportunity cost of lending (1 − m). Since E[S|0] > Rf , the
lowest margin the lenders is willing to accept m > 0 is
E[S|0] = (1−m)Rf (2.6)
I characterize the margin-interest menu that the competition among lenders de-
termines and study its comparative statics in the next lemma. Choosing m = 1
subsumes the case the agent does not borrow.
Lemma 2.1. For each margin m ∈ [m, 1], the lenders offers a unique i(m) solving
(2.5). The loans satisfy:
1. i(m) is decreasing and convex in m.
2. Implied interest rate ι(m) is decreasing in m
3. A Second-order Stochastically dominant increase in the lenders’ beliefs from 0
to 0′
∀s¯ ≥ 0 :
∫ s¯
0
F (s|0′)ds ≤
∫ s¯
0
F (s|0)ds (2.7)
lowers i and ι for each m.
4. A decrease in the opportunity cost of funds lowers i and ι for each m.
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mi(m)
10 m
Figure 2.1: Margin-Interest Menu
Figure 2.1 plots the menu of loans available to the agent. The more the agent puts
down, the lower the default risk and the compensation to the lenders. Convexity rules
out any gains from forming a portfolio of loans to finance the risky asset. Suppose
that the agent wants to buy 2 units financing each unit separately by (m1, i1) and
(m2, i2) such that m1 < m2. The agent puts down (m1 + m2) and owes i1 + i2. If
2 units are financed by a single loan putting down m3 = (m1 + m2)/2, the agent
makes the same down payment with lower interest i3 < (i1 + i2)/2. The corollary of
Lemma 2.1 formalizes this insight.
Corollary 2.1. The agent picks a single loan (m, i(m)) from the menu in Figure 2.1
for each investment level x.
I say that the credit market are looser, as opposed to tighter, if the lenders charge
lower interest I and i for every margin m. There are two lead causes of loose credit:
the lenders’ perception of the risk summarized by the distribution F (S|0) and the
risk-free rate that determines the opportunity cost of each loan in (2.5). The special
case of (2.7) is a mean-preserving contraction; if E[S|0′] = E[S|0] and the lenders
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perceive a lower spread of risky asset values, the competition drives the interest down
at all margins. The same intuition works for a decrease in the risk-free rate as the
the lenders break-even at smaller interest rate at every margin.
2.2.5 The Decision Problem(s)
The agent’s wealth after settling the debt at the end of the period is:
xs+ (w −mx)Rf − xmin(s, i(m)) = wf + x(max(s− i(m), 0)−mRf ) (2.8)
Here wf = wRf is the sure wealth. The central object of studying the margin is the
function `(S,m)
`(S,m) ≡ max(S − i(m), 0)−mRf (2.9)
I refer to `(s,m) as the levered excess return on a unit of risky asset purchased at
margin m when the asset is worth s ∈ S. The agent defaults and hands over the
risky asset to the lenders if S < i(m), the agent keeps the risky asset by paying i(m)
if S ≥ i(m). The term mRf is the opportunity cost of the down payment. The
structure of the payoffs resembles a call option on the risky asset with strike price
i(m) that costs mRf ex ante.
The agent solves
max
(x,m)∈[0,w/m]×[m,1]
U(x,m|θ) ≡
∫
u(wf + x`(s,m))f(s|θ) ds (2.10)
There is an equivalent formulation of the problem whereby the agent chooses how
much money to spend on the risky asset, rather than how many to buy at the unit
price. Denote the down payment on the risky asset
y ≡ mx (2.11)
so that x− y is the size of the loan and w− y is the investment in the risk-free asset.
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The levered excess return on a dollar invested in the risky asset at margin m when
the asset is worth s ∈ S is
λ(S,m) ≡ 1
m
`(S,m) =
1
m
(max(S − i(m), 0)−Rf (2.12)
Notice that ` and λ are related by the leverage ratio because a dollar invested at
margin m buys 1/m units of risky asset each earning max(S − i(m), 0) minus the
opportunity cost Rf . Solving (2.10) is equivalent to solving
max
(y,m)∈[0,w]×[m,1]
V (y,m|θ) ≡
∫
u(wf + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ) ds (2.10’)
Both formulations of the agent’s problem (2.10) and (2.10’) collapse to the stan-
dard portfolio problem if the margin is fixed to m = 1.
2.3 Levered Excess Returns
In this section I show that choosing the margin is tantamount to choosing the
distribution of excess returns. I induce a stochastic order on a subset of these distri-
butions and show that they are never chosen at the optimum. Figure 2.2 plots ` and λ
for two different margins. Since i(mH) < i(mL) by Lemma 2.1, the probability of de-
fault is higher for the low margin. More strongly, Lemma 2.1 proves that i(m)+mRf
is decreasing in m. This implies that the agent investing at a lower margin requires
a higher state s to break even at since i(mL) +mLRf > i(m
H) +mHRf .
Figure 2.2a illustrates a key insight. The agent is better off at the bad states of
the world had she purchased x units at a low margin. This is because if she defaults
on the loan, she does not lose as much. This insight is reversed if the units of levered
excess return is y instead. Figure 2.2b illustrates that a more leveraged (low margin)
agent is better off at the high states of the world because if she does not default, her
excess return on the same y dollars is bigger.
To demonstrate how the choice of margin affects the riskiness of excess returns, I
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0
`(S,mH)
`(S,mL)
−mLRf
−mHRf
(a) Per x units
s
ρExcess
Return
0
λ(S,mL)
λ(S,mH)
−Rf
(b) Per y units
Figure 2.2: Levered Excess Returns for Margins mH > mL
directly compute the distribution of excess returns induced by m by inverting ` and
λ in S whenever S ≥ i(m). Denote
r ≡ `(s,m) , ρ = λ(s,m) (2.13)
for the excess return when the state is s at margin m. Let G1 and G2 be the respective
distributions of r and ρ and g1 and g2 the density functions, whenever they exist. G1
has an atom at −mRf with size F (i(m)|θ). Also, for all r > −mRf , the distribution
and its density are given by
G1(r|m, θ) = F (`−1(r,m)|θ) , g1(r|m, θ) = f(`−1(r,m)|θ) (2.14)
Figure 2.3a illustrates G1 for two margins m
H > mL. The single crossing is flipped
compared to Figure 2.2a due to the inverse operation. The distribution G2(ρ|m, θ)
is obtained by integrating λ−1(ρ,m) instead.
Single crossing distributions are related to increase in risk a la Diamond and
Stiglitz (1974). Buying one unit of risky asset at a low margin generates a lower
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1
−mLRf−mHRf r
G1(r|mH , θ)
G1(r|mL, θ)
(a) G1(r|m, θ) = F (`−1(r,m)|θ)
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0
ρ−Rf
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G2(ρ|mH , θ)
(b) G2(ρ|m, θ) = F (λ−1(ρ,m)|θ)
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Levered Returns
spread of excess returns so intuitively, it is safer. On the contrary, investing one
dollar in the risky asset at a low margin generates a bigger spread of excess returns
and thus, it is riskier. The next lemma computes the expected levered excess returns
in margin m to illustrate the compensation for bigger spreads per x or y units.
Lemma 2.2. E[`(S,m)|θ] rises in the margin m and singly crosses 0 from below.
E[λ(S,m)|θ] ≡ 1/m×E[`(S,m)|θ] is unimodal in the margin with the mode m(θ) ∈
(0, 1) for which E[λ(S,m)|θ] > 0.
Figure 2.4 plots E[`(S,m)|θ] and E[λ(S,m)|θ]. Lemma 2.2 has two implications.
If the agent were risk-neutral, she would take the levered position in the risky asset
that yields the highest expected return regardless its variance. Since the levered
expected return is higher than Rf and the agent does not care about risk, she would
put all her money on the risky asset. This extreme case corresponds to Simsek
(2013).
Corollary 2.2 (Simsek (2013)). If the utility function u were linear and strictly
increasing, then the unique solution to (2.10) or (2.10’) is to invest at m(θ) and to
buy x∗(θ) = w/m(θ) units of risky asset.
57
m
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E[λ(S,m)|θ]
E[`(S,m)|θ]
Figure 2.4: Expected Levered Excess Returns in m
Second, Lemma 2.2 suggests that the higher margin yields a higher expected
return for each unit of risky asset to compensate the bigger spread of excess returns.
For m ≥ m(θ), higher margin yields a lower spread per dollar invested and has lower
expected return. For m < m(θ) however, it is possible to Second-order stochastically
rank the distributions G2. A risk averse agent never invests at a margin less than
m(θ) because
∀y : V (y,mL|θ) ≤ V (y,mH |θ) (2.15)
and strict inequality for some y. Since the solution m∗(θ) to (2.10) and (2.10’) must
coincide, I conclude that Simsek (2013) constitutes a lower bound on the margins
and an upper bound on risky investment for a risk averse agent.
2.4 Solution to the Decision Problem
I characterize the solution to my decision problem (2.10) and (2.10’).
Proposition 2.1. There exists unique interior solutions (x∗(θ),m∗(θ)) and (y∗(θ),m∗(θ))
where y∗(θ) = m∗(θ)x∗(θ).
I present this result in a sequence of lemmata. The agent has two controls (x,m)
or (y,m) and I analyze her optimal choice of one control at a time keeping the other
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fixed. The goal of this approach is to illustrate the potential complementarities
among controls. Intuitively, higher x or y implies that the agent is taking on bigger
risk in her portfolio. The main point of the previous section was that whether higher
margin (lower leverage) is riskier depends on the unit of choice x or y. The general
insight of this section is the following: a risk-averse agent tries to hedge the increase
in risk coming from a higher value of one control by reducing the other. For example,
higher level of investment in the risky asset i.e. higher x induces the agent to lower
the margin she is invest at. Conversely, investing at higher margin reduces the
optimal level of investment. The direction of the hedging complementarity is flipped
in (y,m): higher y induces higher m which in return induces higher y again.
2.4.1 Demand for Leverage
The optimal margin for a given (x, θ) is
m∗(x, θ) ≡ min
(
arg max
m∈[m(θ),min(w/x,1)]
U(x,m|θ)
)
(2.16)
Likewise, the optimal margin for a given (y, θ) is
m∗∗(y, θ) ≡ min
(
arg max
m∈[m(θ),1]
V (y,m|θ)
)
(2.16’)
The maximization problems (2.16) and (2.16’) are well-defined as U and V are
continuous functions maximized over a compact intervals [m(θ),min(w/x, 1)] and
[m(θ), 1], respectively. If the agent wants to buy x > w, buying at the highest
margin such that mx = w risks default with a positive probability. The marginal
utility of wealth is infinity in these states of the world because the agent has no
risk-free savings. When x ≤ w so that the agent can afford the risky asset without
leverage, it is still optimal to borrow some because of the belief disagreement. The
lenders earns zero profit on the loan according to his pessimistic beliefs but the
optimistic agent believes that the lenders is leaving money on the table by asking a
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low payment D. These arguments guarantee that m∗(x, θ) is never the upper bound.
The solution to (2.16) or (2.16’) are not necessarily unique. If there are multiple
margins the agent is indifferent to invest x or spend y at, I invoke a selection rule
that picks the lowest margin so that the agent has the maximum risk-free asset in
her portfolio. I are interested in the comparative statics in (x, θ) and (y, θ).
Lemma 2.3. The optimal margin m∗(x, θ) is non-increasing in x and non-decreasing
in θ. However, the optimal margin m∗∗(y, θ) is non-decreasing in y and non-increasing
in θ.
The agent wants to put down smaller fraction to buy more risky asset. Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) establish that Single Crossing Property is necessary and suffi-
cient for the solution set to rise in an appropriate set order, which guarantees that
the minimum also rises. This property corresponds to the difference
U(x,mL|θ)− U(x,mH |θ) = −x
(∫ ∞
−mHRf
u′(wf + xr)[G1(r|mL, θ)−G1(r|mH , θ)]dr
)
(2.17)
which is obtained by integration by parts on (2.56), singly crosses in x. If the agent
prefers the low mean-low spread distribution G1 induced by m
L over mH for some
xL, the preference is preserved for xH > xL. Intuitively, more investment is riskier
and the agent hedges by switching to a safer distribution of excess returns.
In Figure 2.3a the distribution G1(r|mL, θ) crosses G1(r|mH , θ) once from below
at r = −mLRf . Karlin and Rubin (1956) show that integration over r carries the
single crossing over x if the fictional density u′(wf + xr) is log-supermodular in
(x,−r). I argue that the log-supermodularity premise is guaranteed by Assumption
2.1.
Remark 2.1. Non-increasing absolute risk aversion and non-decreasing relative risk
aversion jointly imply that u′(wf + xr) is log-supermodular in (x,−r).
Then U(x,m|θ) satisfies the Single Crossing Property in (m,−x) for each θ and
the minimum of the optimal solutions m∗(x, θ) falls in x.
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The optimal margin m∗∗(y, θ) has the opposite sign in both y because the single
crossing in excess return distributions is flipped in Figure 2.3b. The analogue of
(2.17) is
V (y,mH |θ)− V (y,mL|θ) = −y
(∫ ∞
−Rf
u′(wf + yρ)[G2(ρ|mH , θ)−G2(ρ|mL, θ)]dρ
)
(2.17’)
which singly crosses in y by the Remark 2.1.If the agent prefers low mean-low spread
distribution G2 induced by m
H over mL for some yL, the preference is preserved for
yH > yL. Spending more on the risky asset is riskier and the agent hedges the risk
by switching to a safer distribution of excess returns.
A more optimistic agent buys the same x at a higher margin. In Figure 2.2a the
agent is better off investing at high margin in the high states of the world because she
gets to keep the risky asset by paying less. Therefore, a shift in beliefs that increases
the likelihood of high states of the world reinforces the high margin. Formally, for
any θH > θL :
Um(x,m|θL) ≥ 0 =⇒ Um(x,m|θH) > 0 (2.18)
suffices to conclude that the optimal margin rises in θ keeping x fixed.
However, a more optimistic agent wants to increase the leverage keeping the down
payment y fixed, instead of keeping x fixed. In Figure 2.3b the agent is better of
investing at a low margin in the high states of the world and a shift in beliefs that
increases the likelihood of these states reinforces the low margin. Formally, for any
θH > θL :
Vm(y,m|θL) ≤ 0 =⇒ Vm(x,m|θH) < 0 (2.18’)
suffices to conclude that the optimal margin falls in θ keeping y fixed.
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2.4.2 Demand for the Risky Asset
The optimal investment for a given (m, θ) is
x∗(m, θ) ≡ arg max
x∈[0,w/m]
U(x,m|θ) (2.19)
Likewise, the optimal down payment on the risky asset is
y∗(m, θ) ≡ arg max
y∈[0,w]
V (y,m|θ) (2.19’)
U(x,m|θ) is strictly concave in x : Uxx ≤ 0 so x∗(m, θ) is well-defined and unique.
When x → 0, Ux(0,m|θ) = u′(w)E[`(S,m)|θ] > 0. When x → w/m, the agent
has negative infinite marginal utility at the states of the world she defaults (that
have positive probability unless m = 1) because she has no risk-free asset. When
m = 1, (2.10) collapses to the standard portfolio problem and is known to have a
unique solution. I assume without loss of generality that x∗(1, θ) < w. To conclude,
U(x,m|θ) is hump-shaped in x for each (m, θ) with a unique peak x∗(m, θ).
The derivatives in y and x are related by the identity
Vy(y,m|θ) = 1
m
Ux(x,m|θ) (2.20)
Therefore, y∗(m, θ) = mx∗(m, θ).
The comparative statics in m and θ are similar because they both shift the dis-
tribution of excess return, albeit in different ways. The margin generates a single-
crossing shift illustrated in Figure 2.3, which is weaker than monotone likelihood
ratio shift that θ generates. Athey (2002) proves that the latter is not only sufficient
for the demand for the risky asset to rise, but also necessary if the risk-free rate Rf
is arbitrary. For this reason it is natural to expect that x∗(m, θ) or y∗(m, θ) do not
have monotone comparative statics for all m.
To circumvent this ambiguity, I filter the margins with a necessary condition for
optimality. It turns out the margins that fail this necessary condition also lead to
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xU
U(x,mL|θ)
U(x,mH |θ)
(a) x∗(mH , θ) < x∗(mL, θ)
x
U
U(x,mL|θ)
U(x,mH |θ)
(b) x∗(mH , θ) > x∗(mL, θ)
Figure 2.5: Margins that Violate the Necessary Condition for Optimality (2.21)
ambiguous comparative statics of x∗(m, θ) and y∗(m, θ) in m.
Remark 2.2. Any margin m that can be a solution to (2.10) satisfies
∀m′ > m : U(x∗(m, θ),m|θ) ≥ (>) U(x∗(m, θ),m′|θ) (2.21)
Any margin m that can be a solution to (2.10’) satisfies
∀m > m′′ : V (y∗(m, θ),m|θ) ≥ (>) V (y∗(m, θ),m′′|θ) (2.21’)
Lemma 2.3 proves that hump U(x,mL|θ) crosses the hump U(x,mH |θ) in x once
from below. Figure 2.5 illustrates a margin mL that fails (2.21). If there exists a
mH > mL that guarantees a higher expected utility for the best portfolio allocation
of mL, then mL is never selected when mH is available. However, nothing can be
said whether x∗(mH , θ) is bigger or smaller than x∗(mL, θ).
Lemma 2.4. Unique interior x∗(m, θ) is non-increasing in m for all m that satisfies
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(2.21) and non-decreasing in θ. However, unique interior y∗(m, θ) is non-decreasing
in both m that satisfies (2.21’) and θ. Since y∗(m, θ) = mx∗(m, θ), the elasticities of
x∗(m, θ) and y∗(m, θ) in m are both less than unity.
For all m and for any θH > θL, a likelihood ratio shift yields
Ux(x,m|θL) ≥ 0 =⇒ Ux(x,m|θH) > 0 (2.22)
and this is sufficient for x∗(m, θ) to rise in θ.
The complementarity insight is true for the set of margins that satisfy (2.21): the
lower the margin, the higher the investment in the risky asset. Formally, I prove
Ux(x,m
L|θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ Ux(x,mH |θ) < 0 (2.23)
Since U is hump-shaped, this condition suffices to argue that the unique peak of
U(x,m) in x falls in m. Intuitively, high margin generates a riskier distribution of
excess returns with high spread and high mean. The agent is risk-averse and hedges
the increasing riskiness of excess returns by investing less in the risky asset.
Once more the sign in m is flipped for y∗(m, θ) compared to x∗(m, θ). Since
the hump V (y,mH |θ) crosses the hump V (y,mL|θ) once from below, if mL < mH
violate (2.21’) then mH is never selected when mL is available. The lower margin
generates a high spread-high mean distribution of excess returns on wealth, therefore
the risk-averse agent hedges the increasing risk by spending less money on the risky
asset.
This corollary exploits the sign-switch of optimal investments in m. One percent
rise in the margin must reduce the investment in the risky asset x∗(m, θ) by less than
one percent, so that the down payment on the risky asset y∗(m, θ) rises but less than
one percent.
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2.4.3 The Optimal Portfolio and the Margin
I complete the proof of Proposition 2.1 by combining the thought experiments
of Lemma 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 2.6a plots m∗(x, θ)−1 and x∗(m, θ) on (m,x) space
whereby the points on the first locus satisfy Um(x,m|θ) = 0 and on the second
Ux(x,m|θ) = 0. Figure 2.6b does the same on (m, y) space instead. The label SSD
marks the margins ruled out by Second-order Stochastic Dominance in Corollary 2.2.
m∗(x, θ)−1 starts above and ends below x∗(m, θ) and has to cross x∗(m, θ) at least
once. Lemma 2.4 proves that the optimal margin has to occur at the decreasing
segment of x∗(m, θ).
m
x
x∗(m, θ)
m∗(x, θ)−1
(m, 0) m(θ)
w
m(θ)
SSD (2.21)
1
(a) Uniqueness in (x,m) space
m
y
w
y∗(m, θ)
m∗∗(y, θ)−1
m(θ)
SSD (2.21’)
1
(b) Uniqueness in (y,m) space
Figure 2.6: Points that Satisfy the First-Order Conditions given θ
In principle the two loci can cross any odd number of times. I prove in the
Appendix that the locus m∗(x, θ)−1 is steeper than x∗(m, θ) locus at any crossing
point. That is,∣∣∣(m∗(x, θ)−1)′∣∣∣
(x∗(θ),m∗(θ))
=
−Umm
−Uxm ≥
−Uxm
−Uxx =
∣∣∣x∗′(m, θ)∣∣∣
(x∗(θ),m∗(θ))
(2.24)
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This inequality also proves the quasi-concavity of U(x,m|θ) in (x,m). The Hes-
sian matrix of (2.10) evaluated at the optimum is negative semi-definite if and only
if (2.24) holds. Hence the interior solution is unique. If the solution to (2.10) is
unique, so is (y∗(θ),m∗(θ)) given by y∗(θ) = m∗(θ)x∗(θ) as a solution to (2.10’).
I conclude this section by comparing Proposition 2.1 with the solution to the
standard portfolio problem which is the special case of (2.10) when m = 1. Figure 2.6
illustrates that at the unique optimum the agent holds a levered portfolio with more
of both risky and the risk-free asset i.e. x∗(θ) > x∗(1, θ) and w−y∗(θ) > w−y∗(1, θ).
The idea that borrowing against the asset using it as collateral increases the demand
for that asset goes back to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). I offer a different intuition
based on how the risk premium, the outperformance of one unit of risky asset over
risk-free return on down payment, changes with leverage. At the optimum
E[`(S,m∗(θ))|θ)] = −COV (`(S,m
∗(θ)), u′(wf + x∗(θ)`(S,m∗(θ)))|θ)
E[u′(wf + x∗(θ)`(S,m∗(θ)))|θ] < E[S −Rf |θ]
(2.25)
which is obtained by re-expressing Ux(x
∗(θ),m∗(θ)|θ) = 0 and the inequality follows
from Lemma 2.2 and m∗(θ) < 1. The smaller the premium needed to hold the risky
asset, the bigger the demand for it. Similarly, the risk premium on 1$ down payment
is larger for m∗(θ) and hence lower the down payment compared to m = 1.
2.5 Comparative Statics
The main comparative statics is good news about the asset values. Despite the
complementarity between the controls (x,m), I cannot appeal to the multi-variable
results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Define a partial order on (x,m) space such
that (x′′,m′′) ≥ (x′,m′) if x′′ ≥ x′ and m′′ ≤ m′. Lemma 2.3 and 2.4 imply that U
is quasi-supermodular in (x,m) in a neighborhood of the optimum. Yet it does not
satisfy single crossing property in (x,m|θ) with respect to this order because a more
optimistic agent invests at a higher margin for any x. Likewise, V (y,m|θ) is quasi-
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supermodular in (y,m) with respect to the usual order but it violates single crossing
property in (y,m|θ). Despite this shortcoming I provide a monotone comparative
statics result locally.
Proposition 2.2. A more optimistic agent invests more in the risky asset, x∗(θ)↗
θ, makes a larger down payment and buys less risk-free asset, y∗(θ)↗ θ, and is more
levered, m∗(θ)↘ θ.
The key inequality I prove in Proposition 2.2 is
Uxθ
−Uxx ≥
Umθ
−Uxm (2.26)
where all derivatives are evaluated at the optimum. The left-hand side of this in-
equality is the vertical shift of the x∗(m, θ) locus in θ at (x∗(θ),m∗(θ)) in Figure 2.6a.
The right-hand side is Umθ/−Umm, the horizontal shift of m∗(x, θ)−1 on (m,x) space,
multiplied by the slope of the locus in absolute value −Umm/ − Uxm to convert the
horizontal shift units into vertical shift units. Ranking vertical shifts in (2.26) lead to
monotone comparative statics locally despite the lack of single crossing property. In
principal I are comparing the direct positive effect of a shift in beliefs on the optimal
margin against the substitution effect of higher investment. Figure 2.7a illustrates
more vertical shift of x∗(m, θ) locus guarantees that the new crossing has to occur
at a higher x and lower m. Notice in Figure 2.7a that more vertical shift is always
coupled with more horizontal shift, which I interpret as x∗(m, θ) being more elastic
all around.
The analysis in (m, y) space is similar; I prove Vyθ/−Vyy ≤ −Vmθ/−Vym whenever
(2.26) holds. This ranking suggests that y∗(m, θ) locus shifts vertically less than
m∗∗(y, θ)−1. In Figure 2.7b illustrates that the new crossing occurs at a higher y and
lower m.
my motivating story is an household investing in real estate by using the home
itself as collateral on the mortgage. Provided the household’s beliefs are based on the
news about the real estate values that are subject to macroeconomic fluctuations,
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x∗(m, θ)
m∗(x, θ)−1
(a) x∗(θ)↗ θ and m∗(θ)↘ θ
m
y
y∗(m, θ)
y∗(m, θ′)
m∗∗(y, θ)−1
m∗∗(y, θ′)−1
(b) y∗(θ)↗ θ and m∗∗(θ)↘ θ
Figure 2.7: Comparative Statics in θ
then Proposition 2.2 predicts pro-cyclical demand for new homes and loan-to-value
ratios on mortgages. Common to most studies of household (mortgage) debt is
the assumption that leverage ratio is determined exogenously through a collateral
constraint a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997-8). I provide a more powerful mechanism:
an increase in the asset values leads to more asset purchased by pledging a smaller
fraction as collateral. Decompose the total change in risky asset demand by
∂x∗(θ)
∂θ
=
∂x∗(m, θ)
∂m
∣∣∣
m∗(θ)
∂m∗(θ)
∂θ
+
∂x∗(m, θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
m∗(θ)
> 0 (2.27)
Both terms are positive and the first captures the added amplification in asset de-
mand due to endogenous increase in the leverage.
Proposition 2.2 has another insightful corollary. The demand for loan is given by
q∗(θ) = x∗(θ)(1−m∗(θ)) (2.28)
which is the investment minus the down payment: x∗(θ) − y∗(θ). It immediately
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follows from the definition that a more optimistic agent has a bigger demand for
loan, q∗(θ)↗ θ, and pays a higher interest rate on the loan i∗(θ)↗ θ as the margin
gets smaller.
Not only the down payment y∗(θ), the investment x∗(θ) and the loan q∗(θ) all
increase with optimism, I can rank their growth rates with respect to the same change
in beliefs. Since y∗(θ) = m∗(θ)x∗(θ) and m∗′(θ) ≤ 0, the log-change in the down
payment must be less than the log-change in the investment. Likewise (2.28) implies
that the log-change in loan demand must be larger than that of the investment.
Corollary 2.3. The elasticities of y∗(θ), x∗(θ) and q∗(θ) satisfy:
y∗′(θ)
y∗(θ)
≤ x
∗′(θ)
x∗(θ)
≤ q
∗′(θ)
q∗(θ)
(2.29)
Continuing with the interpretation of θ as a macroeconomic fluctuation in the real
estate values, this corollary implies that not only the down payments, the investments
and loan demand are pro-cyclical but their growth rates can be ranked. If θ itself is
uncertain and governed by a stochastic process, then the corollary ranks the expected
growth rates and volatilities i.e. loan demand is more volatile than the investment
in the underlying asset and than the down payment on the asset.
2.5.1 Risk Aversion
Suppose instead I would like to compare two agents with different risk preferences
indexed by a parameter α. I say an agent αH with the utility function u(·|αH) is less
risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense than αL if the preferences satisfy:
∀W : −u
′′(W |αH)
u′(W |αH) ≤
−u′′(W |αL)
u′(W |αL) (2.30)
or u′(W |α) is log-supermodular in (W,α). Let x∗(α) and m∗(α) denote the solutions
to (2.10) indexed by preference parameter α rather than optimism parameter θ. Nor
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surprisingly, the comparative statics in α is very similar to θ.
Proposition 2.3. A less risk averse agent invests more in the risky asset, x∗(α)↗
α, makes a larger down payment and buys less risk-free asset, y∗(α) ↗ α, and is
more levered, m∗(α)↘ α.
A change in risk aversion works identical to a change in beliefs because a less risk
averse αH agent can be thought as the same agent αL who weighs the likelihood of
states by the ratio of marginal utilities:
∀s ∈ S : f(s|θH) ≡ u
′(wf + x`(s,m)|αH)
u′(wf + x`(s,m)|αL) f(s|θ
L) (2.31)
By the definition of Arrow-Pratt comparison of risk aversion, u′(W |α) is log-supermodular
in (W,α) and thus the ratio of marginal utilities is rising.
2.5.2 Initial Wealth
Proposition 2.3 lends itself to a monotone comparative statics of initial wealth.
The preferences of a wealthier agent wH > wL can be expressed by a utility function
u(wHf + x`(S,m)) ≡ u(wLf + x`(S,m) + (wHf − wLf )) (2.32)
The agent with utility function u(W+c) is less risk averse than u(W ) for c > 0 if and
only if u satisfies non-increasing absolute risk aversion, which is a part of Assumption
2.1. Therefore, the comparative statics of initial wealth follows from Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.4. A wealthier agent invests more in the risky asset, x∗(w) ↗ w,
makes a larger down payment and buys less risk-free asset, y∗(w)↗ w, and is more
levered, m∗(w) ↘ w. Even though a wealthier agent borrows more q∗(w) ↗ w, she
has a smaller debt-to-income ratio: q∗(w)/w ↘ w.
The first part of Proposition 2.1 is concerned with the absolute quantities and
the second with the relative. A more general statement would be that whenever
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the preferences satisfy non-decreasing relative risk aversion, the second half of As-
sumption 2.1, a wealthier agent invests a smaller fraction of its wealth in the risky
asset, x∗(w)/w ↘ w and a larger fraction on the risk-free asset 1 − y∗(w)/w ↗ w.
Its implication on relative indebted-ness is that the poorer the agent gets, the debt
constitutes a larger fraction of her wealth. In some sense higher wealth leads to a
controversially higher degree of safety due to smaller exposure of one’s wealth to
default risk despite bigger investment in the risky with higher leverage.
2.5.3 The Lenders’ Perception of Risk
A change in the lenders’ valuation of the risky asset is modeled as shift in their
belief distribution F (s|0). Lemma 2.1 proves that a Second-order Stochastically
dominant shift of this distribution, a decrease in risk a la Diamond and Stiglitz
(1974) leads to a loose credit market with lower interest at every margin. I are
agnostic about the source of this shift; it might be good news about asset values,
possibly shared by the agent, or it might reflect an implicit government guarantee
in case the loan defaults. A common narrative for the causes of financial crisis of
2008 is that the mortgage lenders enjoyed implicit and explicit insurance from the
government to lend against real estate. Although a change in borrowing conditions
is often labeled as a credit supply shock, within the confines of my model this is a
comparative statics of the agent’s demand in I. Let x∗(m, i) and m∗(x, i) replace the
optimal solution loci of (2.10) for a given menu such as Figure 2.1.
Proposition 2.5. If there is a second-order stochastically dominance increase in the
lenders’ belief, then the interest rate i falls, and thus the agent’s investment in the
risky asset x∗(i), her down payment y∗(i) and the leverage ratio 1/m∗(i) all increase.
This is the first result that log-concavity of F (s|θ) plays a key role. To see
how this comparative statics is related to the comparative statics of θ, translate the
decrease in I for each m into a shift in the distribution of excess returns. If the state
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s ≤ iH(m), then either the return before and after the shift is the same −mRf or
the agent is better off because iL(m) < s. Whenever s ≥ iH(m):
G1(r|m, iL, θ)
G1(r|m, iH , θ) =
G1(r + i
L − iH |m, iH , θ)
G1(r|m, iH , θ) (2.33)
where r = `(s,m). The ratio of distributions G1(r − c|m, i, θ)/G1(r|m, i, θ) is in-
creasing in r for any c > 0 if and only if G1 is log-concave and G1 is log-concave if
and only if the F is. Therefore, a decrease in i yields a monotone probability ratio
shift.
2.6 Conclusion
When the agent chooses both the optimal allocation and the leverage ratio of
the portfolio, the belief disagreement in the credit market leads to a more leveraged
portfolio with more of both risky and the risk-free assets, compared to the stan-
dard portfolio problem without default and collateral. Moreover, I have shown that
both the borrower’s optimism and the lender’s risk perception lend themselves to
more risky asset bought at lower margins. The model is agnostic about whether the
shifts in these beliefs are a result of rational expectations about the economy’s fun-
damentals, or the investors are irrationally exuberant a la Shiller (2005) about risky
assets during booms, or the banks feel secure because of an anticipated government
insurance a la Admati and Hellwig (2013). The positive theoretical predictions of
borrower and lender-driven shocks have the identical signs, therefore the three popu-
lar narratives are not distinguishable from one another if judged by the single merit
that they predict higher leverage.
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Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Using integration by parts, (2.5) can be expressed as
E[min(S, I)|0] =
∫ I
0
(1− F (s|0)) ds = (1−m)Rf (2.34)
The left-hand side of this equation is an increasing function of I with limits 0 as
I → 0 and E[S|0] as I →∞. The lowest margin the lenders are willing to accept is
given in the text (2.6) and denoted m. Fix any m > m, the function
∫ I
0
(1−F (s|0)) ds
of I crosses the constant (1−m)Rf < E[S|0] at a unique i(m) <∞. At the limit as
m→ 1, I → 0.
The partial derivatives can be obtained by using implicit function theorem on
(2.34).
i′(m) = − Rf
1− F (i(m))|0) < 0 (2.35)
I ′′(m) = − f(i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf i
′(m) > 0 (2.36)
Moreover,
(i(m) +mRf )
′ = i′(m) +Rf = − F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf < 0 (2.37)
which is referred to in the text as the break-even state for a levered position in the
risky asset.
I now solve ι(m) as an implicit function of m. Expand and rearrange (2.34) to
get
ι−Rf = 1
1−m
∫ (1−m)ι
0
F (s|0) ds (2.38)
Fix any m < m < 1, I analyze the left and right-hand sides of (2.38) as a function
of ι on [Rf ,∞). Two solid lines in Figure 2.8 illustrate these functions. ι− Rf is a
linear function from 0 to ∞ with a unit slope. Whereas the right-hand side begins
strictly positive at ι = Rf and has slope F ((1−m)ι|0) ∈ (0, 1) for any ι <∞. Thus
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Figure 2.8: Comparative Statics of Lenders’ Belief and Rf
there exists a unique ι(m) > Rf for any such m. To prove ι
′(m) ≤ 0, differentiate
the right-hand side in m:
1
1−m
[ 1
1−m
∫ (1−m)ι
0
F (s|0) ds− ιF ((1−m)ι|0)
]
< 0 (2.39)
The right-hand side shifts down for all values of ι for a higher m while the left-hand
side is not affected and therefore, the new crossing is at a lower i. At the limit as
m → m, I → ∞ and hence ι → ∞. As m → 1, I → 0 and using l’Hopital’s Rule,
ι→ Rf .
The comparative statics are illustrated by dashed lines in Figure 2.8. A Second-
order Stochastic dominant shift 0 to 0′ point-wise lowers the left-hand side, therefore
the new crossing occurs at a lower ι. A decrease in the risk-free rate point-wise
lowers the right-hand side and the new crossing occurs again at a lower i. Since
i(m) = ι(1−m), a decrease in ι leads to a decrease in I.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Expand the first expectation:
E[`(S,m)|θ] =
∫ ∞
i(m)
(s− i(m))f(s, θ)ds−mRf (2.40)
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Differentiating in m:
∂E[`(S,m)|θ]/∂m =
∫ ∞
i(m)
−i′(m)f(s, θ)ds−Rf =
(1− F (i(m)|θ)
1− F (i(m)|0) − 1
)
Rf > 0
(2.41)
where i′(m) is taken from Lemma 2.1 (2.35). The ratio of survival functions is always
greater than unity by (2.4). As i(m) ↗ ∞, I have E[`(S,m)|θ] = −mRf < 0 and
limm→1E[`(S,m)|θ] = E[S|θ] − Rf > 0 by (2.4), concluding the first part of the
proof.
For the second half, expand the expectation of E[λ(S,m)|θ)] as
E[λ(S,m)|θ] +Rf = 1
m
∫ ∞
i(m)
(s− i(m))f(s|θ)ds (2.42)
Differentiating in m:
∂E[λ(S,m)|θ]/∂m = 1
m
[1− F (i(m)|θ)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf −
1
m
∫ ∞
i(m)
(s− i(m))f(s|θ)ds
]
(2.43)
=
1
m
[(1− F (i(m)|θ)
1− F (i(m)|0) − 1
)
Rf − E[λ(S,m)|θ]
]
(2.44)
The sign is determined by the term in brackets. The likelihood ratio order (2.4)
implies that the first term is decreasing in its argument I and non-negative. The
argument i(m) is a decreasing function of m. Therefore, the first term is a decreasing
function of m with lower bound zero at m = 1.
Consider the limits of E[λ(S,m)|θ]. I have E[λ(S,m)|θ] = −Rf < 0 and at
E[λ(S, 1)|θ] = E[S|θ]−Rf > 0 by (2.4). This proves that the function E[λ(S,m)|θ]
crosses the ratio of survival functions, which decreases from some positive number
to zero in m, at least once. Let m denote the crossing point:
E[λ(S,m)|θ] =
(1− F (i(m)|θ)
1− F (i(m)|0) − 1
)
Rf > 0 (2.45)
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Applying this to (2.44):
E[λ(S,m)|θ] Q
(1− F (i(m)|θ)
1− F (i(m)|0) − 1
)
Rf ⇐⇒ ∂E[λ(S,m)|θ]
∂m
R 0 (2.46)
Figure 2.9 illustrates the unimodality of E[λ(S,m)|θ] at m. E[λ(S,m)|θ] starts
below below the ratio of survival functions and increases in m until it crosses it at m.
After the cross, E[λ(S,m)|θ] decreases in m while staying above the ratio of survival
functions.
m
10 m m
E[λ(S,m)|θ]
(
1−F (i(m)|θ)
1−F (i(m)|0) − 1
)
Rf
Figure 2.9: Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof of Remark 2.1. Assumption 2.1 amounts to
A′(W ) ≤ 0 , R′(W ) = A(W ) +WA′(W ) ≥ 0 (2.47)
Denote r = `(s,m), the function u′(wf + xr) is log-supermodular in (x,−r) if
∂ lnu′(wf + xr)
∂x
=
ru′′(wf + xr)
u′(wf + xr)
= −rA(wf + xr) (2.48)
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is decreasing in r. The derivative of (2.48) in r is
−A(wf + xr)− xrA′(wf + xr) ≤ (wf + xr)A′(wf + xr)− xrA′(wf + xr)
= A′(wf + xr)wf ≤ 0 (2.49)
and both inequalities follows from (2.47). Log-supermodularity implies that
x`(s,m)u′′(wf + x`(s,m))
u′(wf + x`(s,m))
=
yλ(s,m)u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))
↘ s (2.50)
Proof of Lemma 3. U(x,m|θ) is a continuous and differentiable function of m on a
compact set [m(θ),min(w/x, 1)]. The derivative in m is:
Um(x,m|θ) ≡ x
[ F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf
∫ ∞
i(m)
u′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s|θ) ds
−Rfu′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ)
]
(2.51)
By Extreme Value Theorem, there is at least onem∗(x, θ) satisfying Um(x,m∗(x, θ)|θ) =
0 and Umm(x,m
∗(x, θ)|θ) < 0. To prove that the solution does not occur at the upper
bound, consider separately w R x cases. If x ≥ w, then limm→w/x Um(x,m|θ) < 0 as
wf = wRf and u
′(0)→∞. If x < w, then
lim
m→1
Um(x,m|θ) <
lim
m→1
xRf
[ F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)(1− F (i(m)|θ))− F (i(m)|θ)
]
u′(wf − xmRf ) = 0 (2.52)
Since u′ decreasing in s by strict concavity of u, I bound the integral in (2.51)
from above. Since x < w ≤ w/m and F (s|0)/(1 − F (s|0)) ≥ F (s|θ)/(1 − F (s|θ))
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by (2.4), the upper bound (2.52) is non-negative. m → 1 implies I(1) → 0 and
F (0|0) = F (0|θ) = 0, concluding the proof.
Consider now m∗∗(y, θ) that maximizes V (y,m|θ) in m. The first derivative in
m is
Vm(y,m|θ) = x
(∫
i(m)
( Rf
1− F (i(m)|0) −
s− i(m)
m
)
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds
)
(2.53)
By Extreme Value Theorem, there is at least onem∗∗(y, θ) satisfying Vm(y,m∗∗(y, θ)|θ) =
0 and Vmm(y,m
∗∗(y, θ)|θ) < 0. To prove that the solution does not occur at the lower
bound, note that
Vm(y,m|θ) ≥ xu′(wf + yλ(s˜, m))
∫
i(m)
( Rf
1− F (i(m)|0) −
s− i(m)
m
)
f(s|θ) ds (2.54)
where s˜ = i(m)+mRf/(1−F (i(m)|0)) is the point the integrand singly crosses from
above. The lower bound (2.54) follows from integrating the decreasing function u′
out at s˜. The expectation in (2.54) is zero as m → m(θ) by definition of (2.45).
Therefore,
lim
m→m(θ)
Vm(y,m|θ) > 0 (2.55)
concluding the proof.
Result 2.1. m∗(x, θ) falls in x
To prove the assertion, express U(x,m|θ) in (2.10) as:
U(x,m|θ) ≡ u(wf −xmRf )G1(−mRf |m, θ) +
∫ ∞
−mRf
u(wf +xr)g1(r|m, θ) dr (2.56)
so that choosing the margin is identical to choosing the distribution of excess returns.
Use integration by parts twice to obtain (2.17) in the text.
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U(x,mL|θ)− U(x,mH |θ) = x
[ ∫ ∞
−mLRf
u(wf + xr)[g1(r|mL, θ)− g1(r|mH , θ)]dr
+u(wf − xmLRf )G1(−mLRf |mL, θ)− u(wf − xmHRf )G1(−mHRf |mH , θ)
−
∫ −mLRf
−mHRf
u(wf + xr)g1(r|mH , θ)dr
]
= −x
[ ∫ ∞
−mHRf
u′(wf + xr)[G1(r|mL, θ)−G1(r|mH , θ)]
]
dr
(2.57)
I want to show that the difference (2.57) singly crosses 0 in x. Since x > 0 the
integral alone determines the sign. G1(r|mL, θ)−G1(r|mH , θ) singly crosses 0 in r as
plotted in Figure 2.3a. To preserve single-crossing under integration, it suffices that
−u′(wf + xr) is log-supermodular in (x, r) by Karlin and Rubin (1956) and Athey
(2002). Remark 2.1 guarantees the sufficient condition under Assumption 2.1.
Result 2.2. m∗(x, θ) rises in θ
I prove a property similar to Quah and Stroluvici (2009). By (2.4), the likelihood
ratio f(s|θH)/f(s|θL) is rising in s and f(s|θH)/f(s|θL) ≥ F (s|θH)/F (s|θL). Using
these two inequalities
Um(x,m|θH) > x
[f(i(m)|θH)
f(i(m)|θL)
F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf
∫ ∞
i(m)
u′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s|θL) ds
−Rfu′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ
H)
F (i(m)|θL)F (i(m)|θ
L)
]
≥ F (i(m)|θ
H)
F (i(m)|θL)Um(x,m|θ
L) (2.58)
which implies that m∗(x, θ) must rise in θ.
Result 2.3. m∗∗(y, θ) rises in y and θ
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I follow identical steps to the comparative statics of m∗(x, θ) in (x, θ). The
analogue of the difference (2.57) is given in the text (2.17’). G2(ρ|mH , θ)−G2(ρ|mL, θ)
singly crosses 0 in ρ, and the log-supermodularity of u′(wf + yρ) in (y,−ρ) implies
preservation of single-crossing in y. Therefore, m∗∗(y, θ) rises in y.
The analogue of (2.58) is
Vm(y,m|θH) < f(s˜|θ
H)
f(s˜|θL) Vm(y,m|θ
L) (2.59)
where s˜ = i(m) + mRf/(1 − F (i(m)|0)) is the point the integrand singly crosses
from above and hence the inequality is reversed. (2.59) implies that m∗∗(y, θ) falls
in θ.
Proof of Remark 2.2. Suppose that mL does not satisfy (2.21) and there exists mH >
mL such that
U(x∗(mL, θ),mL|θ) < U(x∗(mL, θ),mH |θ) ≤ max
x
U(x,mH |θ) (2.60)
Then mL is never selected when mH is available.
I now generalize (2.21) to a differentiable form. Since U(x,mL|θ) − U(x,mH |θ)
crosses 0 in x > 0 for once, (2.21) can be stated instead as
Ux(x,m
L|θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ U+m(x,mL|θ) ≤ 0 (2.61)
where U+m denotes the right derivative at m
L, which is limmH→mL U(x,mH |θ) −
U(x,mL|θ)/(mH −mL) non-positive for all x ≥ x∗(mL, θ).
Consider now (2.21’). Suppose that mH does not satisfy (2.21’) and there exists
mL < mH such that
V (y∗(mH , θ),mH |θ) < V (y∗(mH , θ),mL|θ) ≤ max
y
V (y,mL|θ) (2.62)
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Then mH is never selected when mL is available.
I similarly generalize (2.21’) to a differentiable form. For convenience of Lemma 2.4,
I provide two versions. Since V (y,mH |θ) − V (y,mL|θ) crosses 0 in y > 0 for once,
and V (0,m|θ) is the same for all m, (2.21’) can be stated first as
Vy(y,m
L|θ) ≥ 0 =⇒ V +m (y,mL|θ) ≤ 0 (2.63)
where V +m denotes the right derivative at m
L, which is limmH→mL V (y,mH |θ) −
V (y,mL|θ)/(mH −mL) non-positive for all y ≤ y∗(mL, θ).
Alternatively, (2.21’) can be generalized for y ≥ y∗(mH , θ) using the same logic
as
Vy(y,m
H |θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ V −m (y,mH |θ) ≥ 0 (2.64)
where V −m denotes the left derivative atm
H , which is limmL→mH V (y,mH |θ)−V (y,mL|θ)/(mH−
mL) non-negative for all y ≥ y∗(mH , θ).
Proof of Lemma 4. The derivative of (2.10) in x for a given m ∈ [m(θ), 1] is
Ux(x,m|θ) ≡
∫ ∞
0
`(s,m)u′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s, θ)ds (2.65)
Evaluated at x = 0, Ux(0,m|θ) > 0 since E[`(s,m)|θ] > 0. As x → w/m,
u′(0)F (i(m))→∞ as long as m 6= 1, thus U(w/m,m|θ) < 0. The second derivative
is
Uxx(x,m|θ) =
∫ ∞
0
`(s,m)2u′′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s, θ)ds < 0 (2.66)
by strict concavity of u. Therefore, there is a unique interior solution x∗(m, θ) such
that (2.65) is zero at this point. When m = 1, I assume without loss of generality
that x∗(1, θ) ≤ w.
Consider instead choosing y∗(m, θ) that maximizes V (y,m|θ) in y. The derivative
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in y is
Vy(y,m|θ) =
∫ ∞
0
λ(s,m)u′(wf + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds = 1
m
Ux(x,m|θ) (2.67)
since λ(s,m) = `(s,m)/m and y = mx. Evaluated at y∗(m, θ) = mx∗(m, θ), (2.67)
vanishes to zero and therefore, y∗(m, θ) is a solution. Since Vyy ≤ 0, this solution is
unique.
Result 2.4. x∗(m, θ) falls in m at the optimum
Compute the cross-partial derivative Uxm
Uxm(x,m|θ) ≡
∫ ∞
i(m)
(−i′(m)−Rf )u′(wf + x(s− i(m)−mRf ))f(s|θ)ds
+
∫ ∞
i(m)
x(−i′(m)−Rf )(s− i(m)−mRf )u′′(wf + x(s− i(m)−mRf ))f(s|θ)ds
−Rfu′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ)−mRf (−xRf )u′′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ)
(2.68)
Regroup the terms to get
Uxm(x,m|θ) = F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf∫ ∞
i(m)
(
1 +
x`(s,m)u′′(wf + x`(s,m))
u′(wf + x`(s,m))
)
u′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s|θ)ds
−Rfu′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ)
(
1− xmRf u
′′(wf − xmRf )
u′(wf − xmRf )
)
(2.69)
Since (2.50) by Remark 2.1, Uxm is bounded above by
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Uxm(x,m|θ) <
(
1− xmRf u
′′(wf − xmRf )
u′(wf − xmRf )
)
Rf×
×
( F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)
∫ ∞
i(m)
u′(wf + x`(s,m))f(s|θ)ds− u′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ)
)
=
1
x
(
1− xmRf u
′′(wf − xmRf )
u′(wf − xmRf )
)
Um(x,m|θ) (2.70)
which follows from the definition of Um(x,m|θ) in (2.51).
The proof is completed using the differentiable version of (2.21) formulated in
Remark 2.2 in (2.61). Whenever Ux(x,m
L|θ) ≤ 0, the cross partial (2.70) is negative
as Um(x,m
L) ≤ 0 and hence, Ux(x,mH) < 0.
Result 2.5. x∗(m, θ) rises in θ
Suppose that Ux(x,m|θL) ≥ 0. I have the chain of inequalities:
Ux(x,m|θH) ≥ f(i(m) +mRf )|θ
H)
f(i(m) +mRf |θL)
∫ ∞
i(m)
(s− i(m)−mRf )u′(wf + x(`(s,m))f(s|θL)ds
−mRfu′(wf − xmRf )F (i(m)|θ
H)
F (i(m)|θL)F (i(m)|θ
L)
≥ F (i(m)|θ
H)
F (i(m)|θL)Ux(x,m|θ
L) ≥ 0 (2.71)
using the implication of (2.4) that
f(i(m) +mRf |θH)
f(i(m) +mRf |θL) ≥
f(i(m)|θH)
f(i(m)|θL) ≥
F (i(m)|θH)
F (i(m)|θL) (2.72)
This inequality proves that at the unique optimum Ux(x
∗(m, θL),m|θL) = 0, the
marginal utility is non-negative for θH , therefore x∗(m, θ) rises in θ.
Result 2.6. y∗(m, θ) rises in m (at the optimum) and θ
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The comparative statics in θ is identical to x∗(m, θ) since Vy is proportional to
Ux by 1/m which does not effect the sign in θ. For the comparative statics in m,
compute Vym
Vym(y,m|θ) ≡ 1
m
∫ ∞
i(m)
( Rf
1− F (i(m)|0) −
s− i(m)
m
)
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))
×
(
1 +
yλ(s,m)u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds (2.73)
Denote the unique point the first term in (2.74) crosses 0 in s from above by s˜.
By (2.50) the last term is also decreasing and crosses 0 in s from above. Regardless
whether 1 + yλ(s,m)u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))/u′(wf + yλ(s,m)) evaluated at s˜ is positive
or negative, Vym(y,m|θ) is bounded below by
Vym(y,m|θ) ≥ 1
y
(
1 +
yλ(s˜, m)u′′(wf + yλ(s˜, m))
u′(wf + yλ(s˜, m))
)
Vm(y,m|θ) (2.74)
The proof is completed using the differentiable versions of (2.21’) formulated in
Remark 2.2 in (2.63) and (2.64) depending on the sign of the first term. If the
first term of the lower bound in (2.74) is negative, then whenever Vy(y,m
L|θ) ≥ 0,
(2.63) implies Vm(y,m
L) ≤ 0 and the cross partial (2.70) is positive. Therefore,
Vy(y,m
L|θ) ≥ 0 implies Vy(y,mH) > 0, concluding the proof. If instead the first term
of the lower bound in (2.74) is positive, then whenever Vy(y,m
H |θ) ≤ 0, (2.64) implies
Vm(y,m
H) ≥ 0 and the cross partial (2.70) is positive. Therefore, Vy(y,mH |θ) ≤ 0
implies Vy(y,m
L|θ) < 0, concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Any bivariate optimization problem can be solved sequen-
tially. In Lemma 2.4 I prove that there exists a unique interior maximizer x∗(m, θ).
Choose m ∈ [m(θ), 1] to maximize U(x∗(m, θ),m|θ). By the Envelope Theorem, the
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optimum is determined by the solution to
Um(x
∗(m, θ),m|θ) = Vm(y∗(m, θ),m|θ) = 0 (2.75)
Evaluate at the lower limit m→ m(θ)
lim
m→m(θ)
Vm(y
∗(m, θ),m|θ) = lim
m→m(θ)
Um(x
∗(m, θ),m|θ) > 0 (2.76)
as Lemma 2.3 proves limm→m(θ) Vm(y,m|θ) > 0 for any y > 0 and y∗(m(θ), θ) > 0.
Evaluate at the upper limit m→ 1
lim
m→1
Um(x
∗(m), θ),m)|θ) < 0 (2.77)
as Lemma 2.3 proves limm→1 Um(x,m|θ) < 0 for all mx < w and x∗(1, θ) < w.
By continuity of Um in m, there must exists an interior m
∗(θ) ∈ (m(θ), 1)
such that the optimality condition Um(x
∗(m∗(θ), θ),m∗(θ)|θ) = 0. Denote x∗(θ) =
x∗(m∗(θ), θ) and (x∗(θ),m∗(θ)) satisfies the first-order conditions of (2.10). Likewise
(y∗(θ),m∗(θ)) = (x∗(θ)m∗(θ),m∗(θ)) satisfies the first-order conditions of (2.10’).
I prove that U is quasi-concave in (x,m) and hence the interior solution I found
must be unique. The Hessian matrix evaluated at (x∗(θ),m∗(θ)) is
H ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ Uxx UxmUxm Umm
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.78)
I aim to show that H is negative semi-definite whenever Um = Ux = 0. Since the
first leading-minors are negative, it suffices to show that determinant satisfies:
detH ≡ UmmUxx − U2xm ≥ 0 (2.79)
Claim 2.1. There exists a constant K ∈ (0, 1] such that at the optimum Um = Ux =
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0:
−Umm
−Uxm ≥ K
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
≥ −Uxm−Uxx (2.80)
If the claim were true, then reorganizing (2.80) implies (2.79) and concludes the
proof. Now I prove Claim 2.1. The derivatives of U and V in m are related by the
identity
Vm(y,m|θ) = Um(x,m|θ)− x
m
Ux(x,m|θ) (2.81)
Evaluated at the optimum, partial derivatives of Vm satisfies
Vym =
1
m∗(θ)
(
Uxm − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxx
)
=
1
m∗(θ)
ψ1 ≥ 0 (2.82)
Vmm =
(
Umm − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm
)
− x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
(
Uxm − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm
)
(2.83)
= ψ1 − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
ψ2 < 0 (2.84)
Lemma 2.3 proves that Vym ≥ 0 and Vmm < 0 is the optimality condition for Vm = 0.
Denote the parenthetical term in Vym by ψ1 and first parenthetical term of Vmm by
ψ2. I have
ψ1 ≤ x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
ψ2
Since ψ1 ≥ 0, if ψ2 ≤ 0 then the proof of the claim is complete with K = 1.
Suppose not i.e. ψ2 > 0. To prove the claim for K < 1 I create a family of
auxiliary variables indexed by k ∈ (0, 1] as
yk = m
kx (2.85)
where y1 = y = mx. The auxiliary variable yk does not have an economic mean-
ing but this does not prohibit maximizing a familiy of auxiliary objective functions
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V[k](yk,m|θ). Let λk(S,m) denote the corresponding excess levered return on yk:
λk(S,m) ≡ 1
mk
`(S,m) (2.86)
The agent’s problem is to choose (yk,m) to solve
V[k](yk,m|θ) ≡ max
∫
u(wf + ykλk(s,m))f(s|θ)ds (2.87)
where the first derivatives are given by
V[k]yk(yk,m|θ) = m−kUx(x,m|θ) (2.88)
V[k]m(yk,m|θ) = Um(x,m|θ)− k x
m
Ux(x,m|θ) (2.89)
Evaluated at the optimum Ux = Um = 0, both first-order conditions of V[k] also
vanishes. I prove an intermediate result to complete the proof of the claim.
Result 2.7 (Family of Auxiliary Controls in k). The optimal solution locus
m∗∗k (yk, θ) is non-increasing in yk and θ for all k ∈ (0, 1]
All I need to show is the isomorphism with the problem studied in Lemma 2.3,
which is to show that λk(s,m
L)−λk(s,mH) singly crosses 0 in s and λk(s,m) singly
crosses 0 in s for each m. Both premises are readily observable in Figure 2.10. When
both default, the opportunity cost −m−k−1Rf is rising in m, whereas when both
pay off, lower margin makes more explosive gains than high margin. Then I apply
Lemma 2.3: V[k](yk,m
H |θ)−V[k](yk,mL|θ) singly crosses in yk and V[k]yk(yk,m|θL) ≥ 0
implies V[k]yk(yk,m|θH) ≥ 0. The two implications prove the two assertions made.
Due to this intermediate result, the partial derivatives of V[k]m evaluated at the
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sExcess
Return
0
λk(S,m
L)
λk(S,m
H)
−mH−k−1Rf
−mL−k−1Rf
Figure 2.10: Levered Excess Returns λk(S,m) for Margins m
H > mL
optimum, which coincide with (x∗(θ),m∗(θ)) are given by
V[k]ykm =
1
m∗(θ)
(
Uxm − k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxx
)
=
1
m∗(θ)
ψ1(k) ≥ 0 (2.90)
V[k]mm =
(
Umm − k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm
)
− k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
(
Uxm − k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm
)
(2.91)
= ψ2(k)− k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
ψ1(k) < 0 (2.92)
The second inequality gives
ψ2(k) ≤ k x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
ψ1(k)
Take the limits of both sides as k → 0
lim
k→0
ψ2(k) = Umm < 0 = lim
k→0
k
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
ψ1(k) (2.93)
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The slope of ψ2(k) in k is
ψ′2(k) = −
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm ≥ 0 (2.94)
as Uxm ≤ 0 at the optimum. Since by assumption ψ2(1) > 0, there exists a unique
k¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ2(k¯) = 0. Now pick any K ∈ (0, k¯), I prove that
ψ2(k) = Umm −K x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxm ≤ 0⇐⇒ −Umm−Uxx ≥ K
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
(2.95)
and
ψ1(k) = Uxm −K x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxx ≥ 0⇐⇒ −Uxm−Uxx ≤ K
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
(2.96)
Combining the two inequalities completes the proof of Claim 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2. I prove the proposition in five steps. First I prove that
x∗(θ)↗ θ but m∗(θ) can rise or fall depending on an inequality relating the horizon-
tal shift of optimal loci in Figure 2.6. At the second step I introduce a third variation
of the decision problem taking q = x(1−m) as the control variable replacing x and
y and provide a similar comparative statics result: q∗(θ)↗ θ and the sign of m∗′(θ)
is ambiguous. Then I take an unconventional step and formulate a fictitious family
of decision problems taking qn = x(1 − m)n as a control variable. I generalize the
monotone comparative statics result qn(θ)↗ θ by induction. I use the implication of
this result to rule out m∗′ > 0 in the first step of the proof, resolving the ambiguity.
The proof is completed by repeating the first step of the analysis on (m, y) space
instead with the additional knowledge of intermediate steps.
Step 1: Analysis on (m,x) Space
Apply Implicit Function Theorem to two first-order conditions of U(x,m|θ) and
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obtain two equations with two unknowns
Uxxx
∗′(θ) + Uxmm∗′(θ) + Uxθ = 0 (2.97)
Uxmx
∗′(θ) + Ummm∗′(θ) + Umθ = 0 (2.98)
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the optimum and therefore suppressed
in the notation. Express x∗′(θ) as linear functions of m∗′(θ)
x∗′(θ) =
Uxθ
−Uxx −
Uxm
Uxx
m∗′(θ) (2.99)
x∗′(θ) =
Umθ
−Uxm −
Umm
Uxm
m∗′(θ) (2.100)
Both lines are decreasing in m∗′(θ) since Uxm, Umm, Uxx ≤ 0. In (2.80) in Propo-
sition 2.1 reproduced here for convenience:
−Uxm
−Uxx ≤
x∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
≤ −Umm−Uxm (2.80)
This inequality implies that (2.99) is flatter than (2.100).
I claim that (2.99) has a bigger m∗′(θ) intercept than (2.100). Lemma 2.3
proves that m∗∗(y, θ) is non-increasing in θ and evaluated at the optimum y∗(θ) =
x∗(θ)m∗(θ)
Vmθ = Umθ − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
Uxθ ≤ 0 =⇒ Umθ
Uxθ
≤ x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)
(2.101)
provided Uxθ > 0. Combined with (2.80), I obtain
−Umθ
−Umm ≤
Uxθ
−Uxm (2.102)
Figure 2.11a plots (2.99) and (2.100) on (m∗′(θ), x∗′(θ)) space. The unique inter-
section of two lines has to occur either on the first or the second quadrant depending
on whichever has the higher x∗′(θ) intercept. However, the comparison of x∗′(θ) in-
tercepts, Uxθ/ − Uxx and Umθ/ − Uxm, is ambiguous. Therefore, x∗′(θ) ≥ 0 but the
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x∗′(θ)
m∗′(θ)Uxθ−Uxm
Umθ
−Umm
(2.99)(2.99)
(2.100)
(a) Equations (2.99) and (2.100)
q∗′(θ)
m∗′(θ)Qqθ−Qqm
Qmθ
−Qmm
(2.99’)(2.99’)
(2.100’)
(b) Equations (2.99’) and
(2.100’)
Figure 2.11: Unambiguous Comparative Statics of x∗(θ) and q∗(θ)
sign of m∗′(θ) is ambiguous.
In Figure 2.6 in the text, the inequality (2.102) implies that x∗(m, θ) shifts hor-
izontally more than m∗(x, θ)−1 in θ. This shift guarantees the intersection of the
optimal locus has higher x∗(θ) but cannot predict m∗(θ).
Step 2: Analysis on (m, q) Space for q = 1−m
The variable q = x(1 −m) stands for the demand for loan. The corresponding
excess levered return on a unit wealth borrowed is
%(S,m) ≡ 1
1−m`(S,m) =
m
1−mλ(S,m) (2.103)
The agent’s problem is to choose (q,m) ∈ [0, w(1/m− 1)]× [m(θ), 1] to solve
Q(q,m|θ) ≡ max
∫
u(wf + q%(s,m))f(s|θ)ds (2.104)
The analysis of Q(q,m|θ) is very similar to U(x,m|θ). Since `(s,mH)− `(s,mL)
singly crosses in s and 1/(1 − mH) > 1/(1 − mL) > 0, %(s,mH) − %(s,mL) also
singly crosses in s. Denote q∗(m, θ) and m∗∗∗(x, θ) the single variable solution loci
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to (2.104).
By following the identical steps as in Lemma 2.3, m∗∗∗(q, θ) is non-increasing in
q and non-decreasing in θ as
Qmθ = Umθ + Uxθ
q∗(θ)
(1−m∗∗∗(θ))2 ≥ 0 (2.105)
and Umθ, Uxθ ≥ 0 at the optimum. Likewise,
q∗(m, θ) = x∗(m, θ)(1−m) = x∗(m, θ)− y∗(m, θ) (2.106)
is non-increasing inm at the optimum because x∗(m, θ) is non-decreasing and y∗(m, θ)
is non-decreasing in m. Finally, q∗(m, θ) is non-decreasing in θ as %(s,m) is single-
crossing in s for each m and θ generates a likelihood ratio shift.
m∗∗∗(q, θ)−1 and q∗(m, θ) loci look similar to Figure 2.6a. The only difference
on (m, q) space is that both loci converge to the point (1, 0) eventually. At the
unique intersection m∗∗∗(q, θ)−1 is steeper than q∗(m, θ), that is −Qmm/ − Qqm ≥
−Qqm/ − Qqq. Apply Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order conditions of
(2.104):
q∗′(θ) =
Qqθ
−Qqq −
Qqm
Qqq
m∗∗∗′(θ) (2.99’)
q∗′(θ) =
−Qmθ
Qqm
− Qmm
Qqm
m∗∗∗′(θ) (2.100’)
Both lines are decreasing and (2.99’) is flatter than (2.100’). Suppose the m∗∗∗′(θ)
intercepts satisfy: Qqθ/−Qqm < Qmθ/−Qmm. Then the unique intersection has to
occur at the fourth quadrant where q∗′(θ) < 0,m∗∗∗′(θ) > 0. However, the premise
implies the q∗′(θ) intercepts satisy
Qqθ
−Qqq =
1
1−m∗(θ)Uxθ(
1
1−m∗(θ)
)2
Uxx
>
Umθ +
x∗(θ)
1−m∗(θ)Uxθ
1
1−m∗(θ)
(
Uxm +
x∗(θ)
1−m∗(θ)Uxx
) = Qmθ−Qqm (2.107)
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This inequality is equivalent to Uxθ/ − Uxx > Umθ/ − Uxm, which guarantees in
Figure 2.11a that m∗′(θ) = m∗∗∗′(θ) ≤ 0, a contradiction. Therefore, the plot of
(2.99’) and (2.100’) on (m∗∗∗′(θ), q∗′(θ)) space must look like Figure 2.11b with the
intersection occurring either in the first or the second quadrant where q∗′(θ) ≥ 0 and
the sign of m∗∗∗′(θ) is ambiguous.
Step 3: A Generalization by Induction
Let subscript n ∈ {2, 3, ..., N} denote an auxiliary variable
qn(m, θ) = qn−1(m, θ)(1−m) = x(1−m)n (2.108)
and q1(m, θ) = q = x(1−m) is the loan demand studied in the previous section.
Denote the corresponding excess levered return on the auxiliary variable qn as
%n(S,m) ≡ 1
1−m%n−1(S,m) =
1
(1−m)n `(S,m) (2.109)
and %1(S,m) is defined in the previous section. For each n, the agent’s problem is
to choose (qn,m) ∈ [0, w(1−m)n/m]× [m(θ), 1] to solve
Q[n](qn,m|θ) ≡ max
∫
u(wf + qn%n(s,m))f(s|θ)ds (2.110)
Denote the single variable solution loci of (2.110) by q∗n(m, θ) and m
∗∗∗
n (qn, θ).
First I study q∗n(m, θ) whose properties do not require induction on n. Since
Q[n]qn(qn,m|θ) =
1
(1−m)nUx(x,m|θ) (2.111)
it follows that q∗n(m, θ) = x
∗(m, θ)(1 − m)n. Therefore at the optimum, q∗n(m, θ)
is non-increasing in m and non-increasing in m and non-decreasing in θ because
x∗(m, θ) is.
Claim 2.2 (Induction Hypothesis). m∗∗∗n−1(qn−1, θ) is non-increasing in qn−1, non-
decreasing in θ. Comparative statics of (2.110) satisfy: q∗n−1(θ) ↗ θ and m∗∗∗n−1(θ)
93
has an ambiguous sign in θ.
Now I study m∗∗∗n (qn, θ). If %n−1(s,m
H) − %n−1(s,mL) singly crosses in s, then
the difference %n(s,m
H) − %n(s,mL) also singly crosses in s since 1/(1 − mH) >
1/(1−mL) > 0. Lemma 2.3 proves that m∗∗∗n (qn, θ) is non-increasing in qn whenever
%n(S,m) is singly crosses in (S,−m). m∗∗∗n (qn, θ) is non-decreasing in θ if
Q[n]mθ = Q[n−1]mθ +Q[n−1]qn−1θ
q∗n(θ)
(1−m∗∗∗n (θ))2
≥ 0 (2.112)
Since Q[n]xθ ≥ 0 for all n, Q[n]mθ ≥ 0 whenever Q[n−1]mθ ≥ 0 which holds by the
induction hypothesis.
In sum, I have proven that the solution to the decision problem (2.110) is identical
to the one described in the previous section for n = 1 on the (m, q) space. Apply
Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order conditions of (2.110):
q∗′n (θ) =
Q[n]qnθ
−Q[n]qnqn
− Q[n]qnm
Q[n]qnqn
m∗∗∗′n (θ) (2.99n)
q∗′n (θ) =
−Q[n]mθ
Q[n]qnm
− Q[n]mm
Q[n]qnm
m∗∗∗′n (θ) (2.100n)
Both lines are decreasing and (2.99n) is flatter than (2.100n) because at the
unique intersection of m∗∗∗n (qn, θ)
−1 and q∗n(m, θ), the former must be steeper than
the latter i.e. −Q[n]mm/−Q[n]qnm ≥ −Q[n]qnm/−Q[n]qnqn .
Suppose the m∗∗∗′n (θ) intercepts satisfy: Q[n]qnθ/ − Q[n]qnm < Q[n]mθ/ − Q[n]mm.
Then the unique intersection has to occur at the fourth quadrant where q∗′n (θ) <
0,m∗∗∗′n (θ) > 0. However, the premise implies that the q
∗′
n (θ) intercepts satisfy:
94
Q[n]qnθ
−Q[n]qnqn
=
1
1−m∗(θ)Q[n−1]qn−1θ(
1
1−m∗(θ)
)2
Q[n−1]qn−1qn−1
>
Q[n−1]mθ +
q∗n(θ)
1−m∗(θ)Q[n−1]qn−1θ
1
1−m∗(θ)
(
Q[n−1]qn−1m +
q∗n(θ)
1−m∗(θ)Q[n−1]qn−1qn−1
) = Q[n]mθ−Q[n]qnm (2.113)
This inequality is equivalent toQ[n−1]qn−1θ/−Q[n−1]qn−1qn−1 > Q[n−1]mθ/−Q[n−1]qn−1m
and it guarantees that m∗∗∗′n−1(θ) ≤ 0, a contradiction with the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, the plot of (2.99n) and (2.100n) on (m∗∗∗′n (θ), q
∗′
n (θ)) space looks similar
to Figure 2.11b with the intersection occurring either in the first or the second
quadrant where q∗′n (θ) ≥ 0 and the sign of m∗∗∗′n (θ) is ambiguous.
Step 4: Proof of m∗′(θ) ≤ 0 by Contradiction
I have proven that for each n ≥ 1
q∗′n (θ) = x
∗′(θ)(1−m∗(θ))n − x∗(θ)n(1−m∗(θ))n−1m∗′(θ) ≥ 0 (2.114)
⇒ x∗′(θ) ≥ n
( x∗(θ)
1−m∗(θ)
)
m∗′(θ) (2.115)
Suppose that on the (m,x) space of Figure 2.11a, the vertical intercepts satisfy
Uxθ
−Uxx <
Umθ
−Uxm ⇐⇒ m
∗′(θ) > 0 (2.116)
This implies that the intersection of (2.99) and (2.100) has to lie above the (2.115)
for all n ≥ 1. The contradiction is illustrated in Figure 2.12.Whatever the value of
x∗(θ)/(1 − m∗(θ)) is, there must exists a large enough N ≥ 1 such that the ray
originating from (0, 0) with slope Nx∗(θ)/(1 − m∗(θ)) lies above the intersection.
Otherwise as n → ∞, (2.115) implies x∗′(θ) → ∞, contradicting that the optimal
solutions are finite.
Step 5: Analysis on (m, y) Space
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x∗′(θ)
m∗′(θ)Uxθ−Uxm
Umθ
−Umm
N x
∗(θ)
1−m∗(θ)m
∗′(θ)
x∗(θ)
1−m∗(θ)m
∗′(θ)
(2.99)
(2.100)
Figure 2.12: Contradiction when m∗′(θ) > 0
Apply Implicit Function Theorem to two first-order conditions of V (y,m|θ) and
obtain the analogues of (2.99) and (2.100)
y∗′(θ) =
Vyθ
−Vyy −
Vym
Vyy
m∗′(θ) (2.99”)
y∗′(θ) =
−Vmθ
Vym
− Vmm
Vym
m∗′(θ) (2.100”)
Both functions are increasing as Vym ≥ 0, Vmm, Vyy ≤ 0. At the crossing point of
m∗∗(y, θ)−1 and y∗(m, θ) in Figure 2.6b, the first locus is steeper than the second,
which implies −Vmm/Vym ≥ Vym/ − Vyy ≥ 0. Therefore, (2.99”) is flatter than
(2.100”).
The m∗′(θ) intercepts are negative and satisfy
Vmθ
−Vmm =
Umθ − x∗(θ)m∗(θ)Uxθ
−(Umm − x∗(θ)m∗(θ)Uxm) + x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)(Uxm − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)Uxx)
(2.117)
≥
− 1
m∗(θ)Umθ
1
m∗(θ)(Uxm − x
∗(θ)
m∗(θ)Uxx)
=
−Vyθ
Vym
(2.118)
since Vmθ, Vmm ≤ 0, Vym ≥ 0 and Umm − x∗(θ)/m∗(θ)Uxm ≤ 0 by (2.80).
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The y∗′(θ) intercepts satisfy
Vyθ
−Vyy ≤ (>)
−Vmθ
Vym
⇐⇒ Uxθ−Uxx ≥ (<)
Umθ
−Uxm (2.119)
I have proven that (2.116) leads to a contradiction in Step 4, therefore the Vyθ/−Vyy ≤
−Vmθ/Vym.
Consider the plot of (2.99”) and (2.100”) on (m∗′(θ), y∗′(θ)) space. Two increasing
lines originate from the second quadrant, satisfying the inequalities relating their
intercepts must cross at the second quadrant where y∗′(θ) ≥ 0 and m∗′(θ) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. I prove that this comparative statics problem is isomorphic
to Proposition 2.2 by proving that the comparative statics of all four optimal loci
have identical signs in α and in θ. Then all partial derivatives in θ in Proposition
2.2 can be replaced by partial derivatives in α.
Step 1: x∗(m,α) and y∗(m,α) rises in α
Suppose that Ux(x,m|αL) ≥ 0. Since the ratio of marginal utilities are rising:
u′(W |αH)/u′(W |αL)↗ W , I have a chain of inequalities:
Ux(x,m|αH) ≥ u
′(wf |αH)
u′(wf |αL)
∫ ∞
i(m)
`(s,m)u′(wf + x`(s,m)|αL)f(s|θ)ds (2.120)
−mRfu′(wf − xmRf |αL)u
′(wf − xmRf |αH)
u′(wf − xmRf |αL)F (i(m)|θ)
≥ u
′(wf − xmRf |αH)
u′(wf − xmRf |αL)Ux(x,m|α
L) ≥ 0 (2.121)
This inequality proves that at the unique optimum Ux(x
∗(m,αL),m|θL) = 0,
the marginal utility is non-negative for αH , therefore x∗(m,α) rises in α. Since
y∗(m,α) = mx∗(m,α), the comparative statics of y∗(m,α) in α is identical to the
proof above.
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Step 2: m∗(x, α) rises in α
Following identical steps as above, I get a chain of inequalities:
Um(x,m|αH) ≥ x
[u′(wf − xmRf |αH)
u′(wf − xmRf |αL)
F (i(m)|0)
1− F (i(m)|0)Rf
∫ ∞
i(m)
u′(wf + x`(s,m)|αL)f(s|θ) ds
−Rfu′(wf − xmRf |αL)u
′(wf − xmRf |αH)
u′(wf − xmRf |αL)F (i(m)|θ)
]
≥ u
′(wf − xmRf |αH)
u′(wf − xmRf |αL)Um(x,m|α
L) (2.122)
This inequality proves that whenever Um(x,m
∗(x, αL)|αL) = 0, the marginal
utility is non-negative for αH , therefore m∗(x, α) rises in α.
Step 3: m∗∗(y, α) falls in α
Vm is given in (2.53). Denote the point the integrand singly crosses from above
by s˜ = i(m) + mRf/(1 − F (i(m)|0)). Then the analogue of the inequality above is
reversed by
Vm(y,m|αH) < u
′(wf + yλ(s˜, m)|αH)
u′(wf + yλ(s˜, m)|αL) Vm(y,m|α
L) (2.123)
This inequality proves that whenever Vm(y,m
∗∗(y, αL)|αL) = 0, the marginal
utility is non-positive for αH , therefore m∗∗(y, α) falls in α.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. For the first half of the proof, I show that this comparative
statics problem is isomorphic to that of risk aversion. Following (2.32), define
u′(wLf + x`(s,m)|αH) = u′(wLf + x`(s,m) + (wHf − wLf )) (2.32’)
and let c = wHf −wLf > 0. The ratio of high wealth and low wealth marginal utilities
is rising whenever u′ satisfies non-increasing absolute risk aversion i.e. u′(W ) is
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log-convex:
u′(wHf + x`(s,m))
u′(wLf + x`(s,m))
↗ s⇐⇒ u
′(W + c)
u′(W )
↗ W ⇐⇒ u
′(wLf + x`(s,m)|αH)
u′(wLf + x`(s,m)|αL)
↗ s
(2.124)
Given this equivalence the comparative statics of w follows from Proposition 2.3.
For the second half of the proof concerning the relative indebtedness q∗(w)/w,
refine the auxiliary objective function Q(q,m|θ) in (2.104) by defining
q¯ =
q
w
(2.125)
as the debt-to-income ratio. The agent chooses (q¯, m) to maximize
Q¯(q¯, m|w) ≡ max
∫
u
(
w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds (2.126)
Clear from the definition of (2.126) that q¯∗(m,w) = q∗(m,w)/w, thus non-
increasing in m at the optimum since q∗(m,w) is. To prove that q¯(m,w) is non-
increasing in w
Q¯q¯(q¯
∗(m,w),m|w) = w
[ ∫
%(s,m)u′
(
w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds
]
= 0
⇒ Qq¯w = w
[ ∫
%(s,m)(Rf + q¯%(s,m)u
′′
(
w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds
]
[ ∫
%(s,m)w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
u′′
(
w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
)
u′
(
w(Rf + q¯%(s,m))
) u′(w(Rf + q¯%(s,m)))f(s|θ)ds]
(2.127)
≤ wfu
′′(wf )
u′(wf )
Q¯(q¯∗(m,w),m|w) = 0 (2.128)
The equation (2.127) follows from non-decreasing relative risk aversion which is
a part of Assumption 2.1 and the fact that %(s,m) singly crosses in s for each m.
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This chain of inequalities prove that q¯∗(m,w) falls in w for each m.
The last desired information is the sign of m∗∗∗∗(q¯, w) in w at the optimum. Note
that
Q¯m(q¯, m|w) = Qm(q/w,m|w) (2.129)
Q¯mw(q¯, m|w) = Qmq−q
w2
+Qmw ≥ 0 (2.130)
The inequality follows fromQmq ≤ 0 at the optimum andm∗∗∗(q, w) is non-decreasing
in w for fixed q since the comparative statics of w is identical to θ and α.
I complete the proof by the following observation:
(q∗(w)
w
)′
= (q¯∗(m∗∗∗(w), w))′ = q¯∗mm
∗∗∗∗
w + q¯
∗
w ≤ 0 (2.131)
both terms are non-positive.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Similar to Proposition 2.3, the four solution loci have the
identical sign structure in i.
Step 1: x∗(m, i) and y∗(m, i) falls in i
The first derivative in x is given by (2.65) in Lemma 2.4. The cross-partial in i
is given by
Uxi(x,m|θ) ≡
∫ ∞
i
(
− u′(wf + x`(s,m))− x`(s,m)u′′(wf + x`(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds
(2.132)
To relate this cross-partial to Ux, I re-express (2.65) by integrating it by parts.
Ux(x,m|θ) ≡
∫ ∞
i
(
−u′(wf+x`(s,m))−x`(s,m)u′′(wf+x`(s,m))
)
F (s|θ)ds (2.133)
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Denote the common term in parenthesis by
υ1(s, x,m) =
(
− 1− x`(s,m)u
′′(wf + x`(s,m))
u′(wf + x`(s,m))
)
u′(wf + x`(s,m)) (2.134)
I prove that υ1(s, x,m) singly crosses in s for each (x,m). The sign is determined
by the first term as u′ ≥ 0 for any finite s. As s → i(m), `(i(m),m) = −mRf < 0
and u′′ < 0 so υ1(i(m), x,m) < 0. Since (2.50) by Remark 2.1, x`(s,m)u′′(wf +
x`(s,m))/u′(wf+x`(s,m)) is decreasing in s. Therefore, the first term starts negative
and increases in s. if it never crosses 0 in s, then Uxi ≤ 0 since f(s|θ) is non-negative.
Otherwise it singly crosses in s.
Log-concavity of F implies that the reverse hazard rate f(s|θ)/F (s|θ) is a de-
creasing function of s. I exploit these two properties to obtain:
Uxi(x,m|θ) =
∫ ∞
i
υ1(s, x,m)
f(s|θ)
F (s|θ)F (s|θ)ds ≤
f(s˜|θ)
F (s˜|θ)Ux(x,m|θ) (2.135)
where s˜ is the point υ1(s, x,m) is zero. This inequality proves that
Ux(x,m|θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ Uxi(x,m|θ) ≤ 0 (2.136)
completing the proof of x∗(m, i) ↘ i. Since y∗(m, i) = mx∗(m, i), y∗(m, i) also falls
in i.
Now I turn onto m∗(x, i). Here the sign in i is ambiguous; it is possible to show
that Umi is bounded above by a positive function and below by a negative function
whenever Um = 0. I consider two cases
Case 2.1. Ux = Um = 0 =⇒ Umi(x,m|θ) ≥ 0
If this is the case, then the final result can be illustrated on Figure 2.6a directly.
A downward shift of x∗(m, i) and an upward shift of m∗(x, i) individually reinforce
higher x∗(i) and lower m∗(i).
Case 2.2. Ux = Um = 0 =⇒ Umi(x,m|θ) < 0
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In this case I complete the proof by establishing the isomorphism between the
comparative statics of i and −θ, and apply Proposition 2.2. The only unstudied loci
is m∗∗(y, i).
Step 3: m∗∗(y, i) rises in i
The first derivative in m is given by (2.53) in Lemma 2.3. The cross-partial in i
is given by
Vmi(y,m|θ) ≡ x
[
− f(i|θ)
1− F (i|0)u
′(wf − yRf ) + f(i|0)
(1− F (i|0))2
∫ ∞
i
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds∫ ∞
i
1
m
(
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))− y
( Rf
1− F (i|0) −
s− i
m
)
u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))
)
f(s|θ)ds
]
(2.137)
To relate this cross-partial to Vm, I re-express (2.53) by integrating it by parts.
Vm(y,m|θ) ≡ x
[
− F (i|θ)
1− F (i|0)u
′(wf − yRf )+∫ ∞
i
1
m
(
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))− y
( Rf
1− F (i|0) −
s− i
m
)
u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))
)
F (s|θ)ds
]
(2.138)
Reorganize the common integrand term in (2.137) and (2.138) as
υ2(s, x,m) =
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))
m
×
(
1 +
yλ(s,m)u′′(wf + yλ(s,m))
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))
+
F (i|0)
1− F (i|0)RfA(wf + yλ(s,m))
)
(2.139)
where A denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
I prove that υ2(s, x,m) singly crosses in s from above for each (x,m). The sign
is determined by the parenthetical term as u′ ≥ 0 for any finite s. As s → i(m),
λ(i(m),m) = −Rf < 0, u′′ < 0 and A > 0 so υ2(i(m), x,m) > 0. Since (2.50) by
Remark 2.1 yλ(s,m)u′′(wf+yλ(s,m))/u′(wf+yλ(s,m)) is decreasing in s. Moreover,
A is decreasing in s by Assumption 2.1. Therefore, the parenthetical term starts
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positive and decreases in s. if it never crosses 0 in s, then Uxi ≤ 0 since f(s|θ) is
non-negative. Otherwise it singly crosses in s.
Log-concavity of F implies that the reverse hazard rate f(s|θ)/F (s|θ) is a de-
creasing function of s. I exploit these two properties to obtain:
Vmi(y,m|θ) ≥ f(s˜|θ)
F (s˜|θ)Vm(y,m|θ) +
f(i|0)
(1− F (i|0))2
∫ ∞
i
u′(wf + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds
(2.140)
where s˜ is the point υ2(s, x,m) is zero. Since the second term is always positive, this
inequality proves that
Vm(y,m|θ) ≥ 0 =⇒ Vmi(x,m|θ) > 0 (2.141)
completing the proof of m∗∗(y, i)↗ i.
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Chapter 3
A General Equilibrium Model of
Leverage1
3.1 Introduction
In the decade running up to the 2008 crisis there was a rapid growth in leverage
(the ratio of assets to equity) both in the household and in the banking sector which
supplies the mortgages that make up the bulk of the household debt. If the house-
hold and bank balance sheets expanded similarly prior to the recession, is there a
structural relationship governing leverage across the two sectors? This chapter intro-
duces a general equilibrium model of credit markets based on belief disagreements
between lenders and borrowers to seek insights into this question. At the epicenter of
this theory is the observation that banks not only lend mortgages to the households,
but also borrow from them in the form of deposits. The equilibrium of this model
features a risk-free interest rate on deposits and two leverage ratios.
A positive shock to asset values raises the equilibrium interest rate and the house-
hold leverage. Compared to the partial equilibrium model of Chapter 2, I find that
the general equilibrium effect of rising, i.e. pro-cyclical interest rates amplifies the
1This chapter presents joint work with Lones A. Smith
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counter-cyclicality of equilibrium loan margins, the down payment on a unit in-
vest, but curbs the pro-cyclicality of debt-to-income ratio. Similar to Chapter 2,
risk-averse households invest their savings in a portfolio of one risky asset and safe
deposits in banks, and decide how much down payment to make on the risky asset
taking as given the banks’ valuation of the collateral as given. As long as banking is
profitable, competitive lenders with limited equity capital enter the credit market to
raise deposits and lend them back to the households. I summarize the equilibrium of
this model by a standard supply and demand curve for equity in the deposit interest
rate. The demand for equity capital is motivated by deposit insurance.
My theory illuminates a novel role the interest on deposits play in transmitting
a positive shock to asset values. The households’ elevated optimism increases the
loan demand to buy more risky asset while putting down less at the same time,
competing lenders push the interest on deposits up to create more funds to meet
this new demand. The interest rate on deposits is the opportunity cost of down
payment for the borrower; the higher the opportunity cost, even lower the incentive
to make a down payment. I find that the loan demand is more elastic in asset values
but less elastic in interest rate compared to the deposit demand. Therefore, the
marginal entrant needs more equity capital to bridge the widening gap between the
loan demand she is facing and the deposits she can collect at the prevailing interest
rate. At the new equilibrium the lender shifts her portfolio more towards risky loans
and less towards treasury bills, but she is less leveraged.
The empirical evidence suggests that leverage in both sectors is pro-cyclical. On
the household balance sheet front, Mian and Sufi (2011), Mian et al. (2013) and
Justiniano et al. (2014) report an unprecedented rise in mortgage-to-income ratios
during 2001-2007. Mian and Sufi (2010) furthers the claim that household leverage
is an early statistical predictor of the recession. The main result of this chapter
is consistent with these findings, however agnostic about the popular cheap credit
narrative. The positive shock to asset values might be according to the households’
or banks’ belief and may not be rationally governed by fundamentals, perhaps due
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to a behavioral bias or implicit government subsidies. All stories lead to the same
positive prediction of a credit-fueled expansion into risky assets.
A key assumption of my model is that the deposit insurance is correctly priced;
the banks pay the full insurance fee on the deposits they raise without the possibility
of a government subsidy. This assumption contributes to a rather counter-factual
prediction that debt-to-equity ratio falls with the business cycle: Adrian and Shin
(2010, 2014) find that almost all the growth in bank balance sheet comes from the
changes in debt. Suppose the interest rate rises just enough to offset the fall in
deposit demand due to households’ optimism. Since the bank’s value of debt has
gone up, insuring them is costlier and the bank has less funds to lend out. However,
the loan demand has gone up due to the difference in elasticities. The consequence
is more equity entering the market and nudging the interest rate down, leading to
more equity and less deposits in the bank balance sheet. This line argument hints at
mispriced deposit insurance increases the bank’s leverage, yet it remains ambiguous
whether it can explain pro-cyclical leverage.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the preliminaries, Section
2 studies how the household portfolio problem behaves in the deposit interest rates
that might arise at the equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the unique equilibrium
and Section 4 presents the comparative statics. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model
There are two types of identical agents in the economy: a unit mass of borrowers
(households) and a large number of potential lenders (banks). There is only one
period. All decisions are made at the beginning and the payoffs are realized at the
end. All agents derive utility from the terminal wealth W and negative wealth is not
allowed. The borrowers’ preferences on terminal wealth are modeled by a exponential
utility function
u(W ) ≡ −e−αW (3.1)
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with a constant absolute risk aversion coefficient α and increasing relative risk aver-
sion. Lenders are risk neutral.
Each borrower is endowed with initial wealth w > 0. She allocates her initial
wealth between one risky and one risk-free asset. Neither of these assets can be sold
short. Let x denote the investment in the risky asset whose price is normalized to
unity. Each unit of this asset yields a dollar payoff s ≥ 0 at the end of the period.
This is the source of all uncertainty in the model, so ex ante is denoted S.
The borrowers and lenders have different subjective beliefs about the distribu-
tion of S and they agree to disagree about it. The differences in beliefs are governed
by two parameters θ and σ. Borrower’s optimism measure (θ) exceeds the lender’s
(0), and σ denotes the lender’s measure of risk. Let two continuous and differen-
tiable probability density functions f(s|θ), f(s|0, σ) represent the subjective beliefs
on full support s ∈ [0,∞). F (s|θ) and F (s|0, σ) denote their cumulative distribution
functions and I assume that they are log-concave functions of s.
I formalize optimism and risk measures by stochastic orders in θ and σ respec-
tively. A borrower with θH > θL is more optimistic if her beliefs satisfy monotone
likelihood ratio property :
f(s|θH)
f(s|θL) ↗ s (3.2)
or f(s|θ) is log-supermodular in (s, θ). The lender with σH > σL deems S riskier if
her beliefs are Second-order stochastically ordered in σ:
∀s¯ ≥ 0 :
∫ s¯
0
F (s|0, σL)ds ≤
∫ s¯
0
F (s|0, σH)ds (3.3)
Unless the comparative statics of σ is studied explicitly, I simply write f(s|0) and
F (s|0) to represent the lender’s belief.
Potential lenders decide whether to open a bank in this economy. Each new
lender brings equity capital. Let κ ∈ [0,∞) denote the mass of equity capital in
the market, which is determined at the equilibrium. Its supply reflects the available
outside options to the equity holders, which is holding the treasury bill and earn Rf
107
Lenders collect deposits from the borrowers by offering a fixed return Rd, also
to be determined at the equilibrium, and invest their funds by making risky loans
to the borrower and holding treasury bills with a fixed return Rf determined by the
monetary authority outside the model. The deposits are legally required to be fully
insured and that the deposit insurance has to be provided privately, which restricts
the lender’s investment opportunities. Due to this insurance, the deposits are the
risk-free asset for the borrowers.
I assume that the expectation of the subjective beliefs satisfy
E[S|θ] > Rf > E[S|0] (3.4)
so that the optimistic borrower is always the natural buyer of the asset. If the deposit
interest rate Rd lenders offer to the borrower is less than Rf , the borrowers hold only
the treasury bills as the risk-free asset in their portfolio. Therefore, Rd ≥ Rf must
hold at the equilibrium for lenders to leverage their equity with deposits. (3.4) puts a
ceiling on deposit interest rates. If Rd ≥ E[S|θ], the borrower has no demand for the
risky asset and prefers to hold deposits alone. The equilibrium interest on deposits
must satisfy:
Rd ∈ (Rf , E[S|θ]) (3.5)
The lenders supply loans backed by collateral to finance the borrower’s demand for
the risky asset. Each lender presents a menu of loans specifying per unit investment:
(1) the fraction put down by the borrower at the beginning of the period, denote m
for margin, (2) the promised payment at the end of the period, denote i for gross
interest. All loans are non-recourse; if the risky asset is worth less than i, the lender
seizes the risky asset as collateral but cannot touch the borrower’s deposits. If the
borrower buys x units of risky asset, then
y ≡ mx , d ≡ w − y , q ≡ (1−m)x (3.6)
y is the down payment, d is the investment in the risk-free deposits, q is the size of
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the loan. Finally, 1/m is the borrower’s leverage ratio.
Table 3.1 illustrates the balance sheet of a representative borrower on right and
a lender on the left. The lender’s leverage ratio would be d/κ+ 1.
Table 3.1: Balance Sheets
(a) Lender
Loan κ - Equity
T-Bills d - Deposit
(b) Borrower
y - Down payment q - Loan
d - Deposit (w-q) - Net Worth
3.2.1 The Supply of Loans
The borrowers choose from a menu of loans indexed by (m, i). Lenders screen
the borrower and charge a fixed fee φ > 0 per unit loan to cover their screening cost
left outside the model. Competition among lenders drive the excess return on each
loan to their fee:
E[min(S, i)|0] = (1 + φ)(1−m)Rf (3.7)
The left-hand side is the expected payoff from lending against one unit of risky asset
promising i in return. Since the borrower puts down m for that one unit, (1−m)Rf
is the monetary opportunity cost of lending. Dividing both sides of (3.7) by (1−m),
the expected return on each loan is (1 + φ)Rf .
Since E[S|0] < Rf , the lowest margin the lenders are willing to accept is:
E[S|0] = (1 + φ)(1−m)Rf (3.8)
For any margin larger than m, I solve and plot the competitive interest i(m) solving
(3.7).
Lemma 3.1. There exists a unique, decreasing and convex i(m) satisfying (3.7) for
all m ∈ [m, 1]. A decrease in Rf or φ lowers i for each m. An increase in lender’s
risk measure σ increases i for each m.
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mi(m)
10 m
σL
σH
Figure 3.1: Margin-Interest Menu
3.2.2 The Borrower’s Problem in Partial Equilibrium
The borrower takes the menu in Figure 3.1 and the deposit interest rate Rd as
given. She chooses her portfolio allocation and the margin. The main result of
subsection is borrowed from Chapter 2. The borrower’s objective function is
max
(x,m)∈[0,w/m]×[m,1]
U(x,m|Rd, θ) ≡
∫
−eα(wRd+x`(s,m|Rd))f(s|θ) ds (3.9)
where the function
`(S,m|Rd) ≡ max(S − i(m), 0)−mRd (3.10)
is the levered excess return on a unit of risky asset purchased at margin m when the
asset is worth s ∈ S.
Proposition 3.1. For any (Rd, θ) the borrower chooses a unique portfolio of x(θ, Rd)
invested in the risky asset by putting down a fraction m(θ, Rd) < 1, and d(θ, Rd)
invested in a risk-free deposit account. A more optimistic borrower invests more in
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the risky asset (x(θ, Rd)↗ θ) with a higher leverage ratio (m(θ, Rd)↘ θ) and invests
less in the deposit (d(θ, Rd)↘ θ).
Even though a positive shock to asset values separately reinforces higher invest-
ment in the risky asset and investing at higher margins, the two choices are substi-
tutes. I find that the borrower re-balances her portfolio more than she adjusts its
leverage. Therefore, the effect of higher x dominates at the optimum. I rank the
elasticities of q, x and y in θ using m′(θ) ≤ 0.
q′(θ)
q(θ)
≥ x
′(θ)
x(θ)
≥ y
′(θ)
y(θ)
(3.11)
I conclude this section with a reminder on the comparative statics of σ. An
increase in the lender’s perception of risk, a point-wise higher interest menu leads
to smaller demand for the risky asset and the loan, and higher demand for deposits.
Essentially the comparative statics of σ is isomorphic to that of −θ.
3.3 Deposit Interest Rate
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the borrower’s portfolio and leverage
decisions in the deposit interest rate Rd. The return on the safe asset affects not
only the demand for that asset, i.e. deposits d, but also the risky asset and the loan
demand q. Since the price of the risky asset is normalized to one, 1/Rd is the relative
price of deposits. The comparative statics of deposit interest rate is the cross-price
elasticity of risky asset demand. Earlier literature offers limited guidance regarding
the sign of this elasticity. As early as Fishburn and Porter (1976) noted that in
the standard portfolio problem without leverage (m = 1), the risky asset demand
changes ambiguously in the face of higher risk-free return. The ambiguity is because
Rd operates through two opposing channels: lower excess return and higher sure
wealth.
Levered excess return `(S,m|Rd) is lower at every state s ∈ S because the op-
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portunity cost of down payment is bigger when the safe return is higher. I guarantee
that lower excess return per unit investment lowers the demand for the risky asset if
the distribution of S is log-concave. The second channel operates through risk aver-
sion. Higher return on safe asset increases the reference sure wealth which makes the
investor less risk averse and demand more risky asset.
My motivation for exponential utility is to shut down the second channel. Con-
stant absolute risk aversion subdues the wealth effect and I guarantee that x(m,Rd, θ)
falls in Rd for all (m, θ). Formally
Ux(x,m|Rd, θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ UxRd(x,m|Rd, θ) ≤ 0 (3.12)
By their definition this inequality also guarantees that down payment y(m,Rd, θ)
and loan demand q(m,Rd, θ) fall in Rd at every margin.
How the borrower would adjust the margin m(x,Rd, θ) in the face of higher safe
return is unstudied to the best of my knowledge. I argue that it follows a similar logic
to x(m,Rd, θ), albeit stronger. The higher the opportunity cost of down payment
mRd per unit investment, the less the borrower is willing to put down. However,
higher sure wealth reinforces the opposite strategy through risk aversion. Constant
absolute risk aversion guarantees that the wealth effect is muted and therefore, the
optimal margin falls in Rd.
Um(x,m|Rd, θ) ≥ 0 =⇒ UmRd(x,m|Rd, θ) < 0 (3.13)
The stronger implication is that it is also optimal to lower the margin holding
y or q fixed, rather than x fixed. In Chapter 2 I have proven that the comparative
statics of m in x and y are different because depending on whether I assess the risk
per unit or per dollar basis, higher margin can be riskier or safer. While (m,x) are
substitutes, the higher the margin the lower the demand for the risky asset and vice
versa, (m, y) are complements. The choice of units is irrelevant in the comparative
statics of Rd because the opportunity cost of down payment always rises Rd. An
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increase in deposit interest rate lowers y for all m and m for all y, then y(Rd, θ) and
m(Rd, θ) jointly fall in Rd. This suggests an upward sloping supply of deposits; the
higher the return the lender offers, the more deposits it collects.
Proposition 3.2. The higher the interest rate on deposits Rd, the borrower spends
less on the risky asset (y(Rd, θ)↘ Rd), more on deposits (d(Rd, θ)↗ Rd) and she is
more leveraged (m(Rd, θ)↘ Rd). She also has a smaller demand for the risky asset
(x(Rd, θ)↗ Rd) and the loan (q(Rd, θ)↘ Rd).
The comparative statics of x(Rd, θ) is subtle because it is a matter of whether
x(Rd, θ) or m(Rd, θ) shifts down more in Rd. Figure 3.2 illustrates the comparative
statics result. In response to the same interest rate change, the borrower adjusts the
margin more than she re-balances her portfolio. This assertion is the polar opposite
of the elasticities in θ, following Proposition 3.1 I have argued that the margin is less
elastic than investment facing a positive shock on asset values.
Formally, I prove the inequalities∣∣∣ UmRd−Uxm
∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣ UxRd−Uxx
∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣ UmRd−Umm
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ UxRd−Uxm
∣∣∣ (3.14)
The first inequality ranks the vertical shifts. If m(Rd, θ) shifts vertically down more
than x(Rd, θ), then the new crossing is guaranteed to occur at a lower m but x can be
higher or lower. The second inequality ranks the horizontal shifts which guarantees
that x(Rd, θ) is lower. The comparative statics of q(Rd, θ) is similar, in fact this is
what I establish in the Appendix and deduce the comparative statics statement for
x(Rd, θ) from it.
I conclude this section with a ranking of elasticities in Rd. Given that m
′(Rd) ≤ 0,∣∣∣q′(Rd)
q(Rd)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣x′(Rd)
x(Rd)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣y′(Rd)
y(Rd)
∣∣∣ (3.15)
Compare (3.15) to (3.11) the ranking of elasticities are reversed; the loan demand
shifts the least with respect to a change in Rd. This reversion has two implications.
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x(m,RHd , θ)
m(x,RHd , θ)
−1
Figure 3.2: x(Rd, θ)↘ Rd and m(Rd, θ)↘ Rd
If there is a joint increase in (Rd, θ), then the elasticity of loan demand q is still
larger than that of asset demand x and down payment y. Consider the elasticity of
substitution between θ and Rd and how much the deposit interest rate must fall to
compensate an increase in optimism. Since d′ = −y′ for both Rd and θ, the elasticity
of substitution for q, x and deposits d can be ranked as
qθ(Rd, θ)
−qRd(Rd, θ)
≥ xθ(Rd, θ)−xRd(Rd, θ)
≥ −dθ(Rd, θ)
dRd(Rd, θ)
(3.16)
3.4 The Unique Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by two conditions: (i) free-entry determines how
much equity flows into the market until expected profits from banking vanish for a
given deposit interest rate Rd, and (ii) Rd clears the loan market for a given mass of
equity κ.
What remains to be established is each lender’s investment plan given her total
funds κ + d(Rd, θ), her equity and deposits. Since the lender is risk-neutral and
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earns the fee (1 + φ) on risky loans, she strictly prefers loans over holding treasury
bills. Lenders cannot make only risky loans because they cannot promise a risk-free
return on deposits without holding treasury bills against bad states of the world.
Let L denote the loans, the minimum amount T each lender invests in treasury bills
equates the returns
L · 0 + TRf = d(Rd, θ)Rd (3.17)
so that she can repay the deposits even in the extremely rare worst-case scenario
in which the loan entirely busts. The balance sheet equates assets to liabilities, or
L + T = κ + d. Since the bank faces a demand for loans L = q(R∗d(θ), θ) at the
equilibrium, the derived demand for bank capital is:
κD(Rd, θ) ≡ q(Rd, θ) + d(Rd, θ)
(Rd
Rf
− 1
)
(3.18)
Next, consider supply. Free entry into banking implies that there is no excess
return from banking at the equilibrium. Thus, the supply of loanable funds κS(Rd, θ)
satisfies the arbitrage condition:
(1 + φ)
q(Rd, θ)
κS(Rd, θ)
= 1 (3.19)
(1 + φ)Rf × q/κ is the return on marginal equity, and the opportunity cost of that
equity is Rf . The market clears at the equilibrium when
κD(Rd, θ) = κ
S(Rd, θ) (3.20)
This system (3.18) and (3.19) gives two non-linear equations with two unknowns.
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique equilibrium with κ∗(θ) ∈ (0,∞) and R∗d(θ) ∈
(Rf , E[S|θ]).
The equilibrium conditions (3.19) and (3.20) are solved graphically in Figure 3.3.
κS(Rd, θ) falls in the interest rate Rd. Intuitively, higher deposit interest rates deter
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κLender’s
Payoff
(1 + φ)q(RLd , θ
H)/κ
(RHd , θ
L)
1
(a) Free-Entry Condition (3.19)
κ
Quantity
κ(1− 1
1+φ
)
d(RLd , θ
L)
(
RLd
Rf
− 1
)
(RHd , θ
H)
(b) κD(Rd, θ) when (3.20) holds
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Conditions
investing in banks. An increase in Rd reduces the loan demand q, making banking
less attractive. At the limit Rd → Rf , the loan demand is (1 + φ)q(Rf , θ) > 0, so
some equity enters the market. When Rd → E[S|θ], the loan demand is zero so the
supply of equity is zero.
Consider next, κD(Rd, θ). It is hard to sign the equity demand in (Rd, θ) in
general, yet it suffices to do so at the equilibrium. At the limit Rd → Rf , the
lenders either do not collect deposits because the households invest in the treasury bill
directly. Then the loan demand q(Rf , θ) is satisfied directly out of equity. However,
κD(Rf , θ) = q(Rf , θ) is strictly less than κ
S(Rf , θ) = (1 + φ)q(Rf , θ). This is the
crucial role the fees play, if the expected return on loan is identical to treasury bills,
the equilibrium interest rate is Rf and deposits play no role. When Rd → E[S|θ],
the households invest all their savings into deposits and some positive level of equity
is needed to insure them, even though κS = 0 since there is no demand for loan.
Therefore, (3.20) must hold at least once at an interior interest rate.
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E[S|θ]
Rf κS(Rd, θ)
κD(Rd, θ)
R∗d(θ)
κ∗(θ)
Figure 3.4: Unique Equilibrium
To prove uniqueness, I show that whenever (3.20) holds, κD(Rd, θ) given by
κD
(
1− 1
1 + φ
)
= d(Rd, θ)
(Rd
Rf
− 1
)
(3.21)
is positively sloped in Rd. Figure 3.3b plots the two sides of this equation. The left-
hand side is a linear increasing function of κ. Since the amount of treasury bills rises
in Rd, the new intersection occurs at a higher κ, concluding the assertion. Figure 3.4
puts together κD(Rd, θ) and κ
S(Rd, θ). Finally, the unique equilibrium determines
the lender’s debt-to-equity ratio from (3.20) by
d(R∗d(θ), θ)
κ∗(θ)
=
(
1− 1
1 + φ
)
/
(R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1
)
(3.22)
whereas, the borrower’s leverage ratio is 1/m(R∗d(θ), θ). Note that the two leverage
ratios have the opposite sign in Rd; the higher the interest rate, the lower the bor-
rower’s margin and therefore the higher her leverage ratio, yet the the converse is
true the lender.
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3.5 Comparative Statics
I are interested in the general equilibrium effect of a shock to the asset values
θ. Keeping the supply of loans fixed, the borrower puts down a smaller fraction
of the risky investment in the portfolio if she is more optimistic. Suppose that the
deposit interest rate rises with optimism, consistent with the pro-cyclical behavior
of interest rates. Then the general equilibrium effect further reinforces the increase
in the borrower’s leverage ratio but dampens her demand for the risky asset.
Proposition 3.4. An increase in the borrower’s optimism θ leads to an equilibrium
with higher interest on deposits (R∗d(θ)↗ θ) and more equity flowing into the market
(κ∗(θ)↗). As a result, the borrowers are more levered, while the lenders are less.
κ
Rd
E[S|θ]
Rf κS(Rd, θ)
κD(Rd, θ)
R∗d(θ
H)
κ∗(θH)
Figure 3.5: Comparative Statics in θ
I illustrate the comparative statics graphically in Figure 3.5. The higher the opti-
mism, the bigger the loan demand q and so more equity to enters to take advantage
of lending opportunities. However, optimism lowers the deposit demand d so less
equity is needed to insure them according to (3.18). Both shifts separately reinforce
higher deposit interest rate.
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Facing higher equilibrium interest rate as a result of both forces, the borrower
further lowers her margin since
∂
∂θ
(
m∗(R∗d(θ), θ)
)
= m∗θ +m
∗
Rd
R∗′d (θ) < 0 (3.23)
The first negative term captures the partial equilibrium effect and the general equi-
librium amplifies low margins by increasing the opportunity cost of down payment
through higher deposit interest rate.
The net effect on κ∗(θ) is governed by the vertical shifts of (3.19) and (3.20). The
ranking of elasticity of substitutions in (3.16) determines which locus shifts more.
The vertical shift of (3.19), the change in Rd holding κ constant, is given by
qθ(R
∗
d(θ), θ)
−qRd(R∗d(θ), θ)
(3.24)
and the vertical shift of (3.20) is
−dθ(R∗d(θ), θ)(R
∗
d(θ)
Rf
− 1)
dRd(R
∗
d(θ), θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) + d(R∗d(θ),θ)
Rf
(3.25)
Since qθ/− qRd ≥ −dθ/dRd and d/Rf > 0, (3.25) is less than (3.24) and (3.19) shifts
vertically more than (3.20). This ranking guarantees that the new equilibrium has a
bigger mass of lenders in the market.
The immediate implication of an higher κ∗(θ) is that the equilibrium quantity of
loans is higher
∂
∂θ
(
q(R∗d(θ), θ)
)
> 0 (3.26)
by (3.19) despite the higher interest rate. However, the new equilibrium features less
deposits. Re-organize (3.18) such that
1 =
q(R∗d(θ), θ)
κ∗(θ)
+
T ∗(θ)
κ∗(θ)
− d(R
∗
d(θ), θ)
κ∗(θ)
(3.27)
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where T ∗(θ) = d(R∗d(θ), θ)R
∗
d(θ)/Rf is the treasury bills. At any equilibrium the
ratio q/κ is a constant, therefore the change in treasury holdings per equity equals
the change in debt-to-equity ratio. Since R∗′(θ) > 0, debt-to-equity ratio must be
falling in θ and so is treasury holdings of the lender. To summarize, I find that a
rise in the borrower’s optimism pushes the deposit interest rate not high enough to
lower the loan demand, nor to increase the deposit demand. The lender’s balance
sheet shifts towards more risky loans and less treasury bills, and is less leveraged.
I conclude this section with a corollary of Proposition 3.4.
Corollary 3.1. A decrease in lender’s risk measure σ leads to an equilibrium with
higher interest on deposits (R∗d(θ) ↗ θ) and more equity flowing into the market
(κ∗(θ)↗ θ).
In terms of signs, the predictions of σ are identical to that of −θ, the borrower
getting more pessimistic. The only distinction is the mechanism through which σ-
shock works. If the lender deems S less risky, the menu of loans shift downwards
as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Intuitively, this is cheap credit. I have established in
Chapter 2 that cheap credit has the identical predictions to θ, and this corollary
argues that the isomorphism extends to general equilibrium.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to two literatures, household finance and commercial
bank capital structure, by explicitly modeling the reciprocal interaction between
banks and the households in mortgage markets. I find that the household’s loan
margins and debt-to-income ratios are pro-cyclical and the general equilibrium effect
of interest rates amplifies this pro-cyclicality. A correctly-priced deposit insurance
leads to counter-cyclical bank leverage. I aim to explore the implications of mis-
priced deposit insurance scheme in future work.
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Appendix 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. See the proof of Lemma 1 in Chapter 2. The comparative
statics of φ is identical to the comparative statics of Rf .
Proof of Proposition 3.1. See Chapter 1 the proof of Proposition 1 for the existence
and uniqueness, and Proposition 2 for the comparative statics of θ.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Consider the objective function V (y,m) defined in Chapter
2 by
V (y,m|Rd, θ) ≡ max
y,m
∫
u(wRd + yλ(s,m|Rd))f(s|θ)ds (3.28)
where y = mx, λ(s,m|Rd) = m`(s,m|Rd) and utility function u is given by (3.1).
The optimal margin given (y,Rd, θ) is denoted by m
∗∗(y,Rd) that satisfies
Vm(y,m|Rd, θ) = x
∫
I(m)
( Rf
1− F (I(m)|0)−
s− I(m)
m
)
u′(wRd+yλ(s,m|Rd))f(s|θ) ds = 0
(3.29)
The cross-partial derivate in Rd is
VmRd(y,m|Rd, θ) = x
∫
I(m)
( Rf
1− F (I(m)|0) −
s− I(m)
m
)
(w − y)u′′(wd + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds
(3.30)
= −x(w − y)α
∫
I(m)
( Rf
1− F (I(m)|0) −
s− I(m)
m
)
u′(wd + yλ(s,m))f(s|θ)ds
(3.31)
= −(w − y)αVm(y,m|Rd, θ) (3.32)
where the second line is exploiting the constant absolute risk aversion property of
(3.1). Therefore I prove
Vm(y,m|Rd, θ) = 0⇐⇒ VmRd(y,m|Rd, θ) = 0 (3.33)
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Hence, m∗∗(y,Rd, θ) is independent of Rd.
Denote m∗(x,Rd, θ) as the solution to (3.9) that satisfies
Um(x,m|θ) = x
[ ∫ ∞
I(m)
( Rf
1− F (I(m)|0) −Rd
)
u′(wRd + x`(s,m|Rd)f(s|θ) ds
−Rdu′(wRd − xmRd)F (I(m)|θ)
]
= 0 (3.34)
concluding the proof.
The cross-partial derivate in Rd is
UmRd(x,m|Rd, θ) = −xE[u′(wRd + x`(s,m|Rd)|θ]
+ x
[
(w −mx)
∫ ∞
I(m)
( Rf
1− F (I(m)|0) −Rd
)
u′′(wRd + x`(s,m|Rd))f(s|θ) ds
− (w −mx)Rdu′′(wRd − xmRd)F (I(m)|θ)
]
(3.35)
= −xE[u′(wRd + x`(s,m|Rd)|θ]− (w −mx)αUm(x,m|Rd, θ) (3.36)
The second and the third line exploit the constant absolute risk aversion property
of (3.1). Therefore I prove
Um(x,m|Rd, θ) = 0⇐⇒ UmRd(x,m|Rd, θ) < 0 (3.37)
Hence, m∗(x,Rd, θ) falls in Rd.
Since Vy = 1/m× Ux, the solutions x∗(m,Rd, θ) and y∗(m,Rd, θ) have the same
sign in Rd. Observe that at the optimum
Vm(y,m|Rd, θ) = Um(x,m|Rd, θ)− x
∗(Rd, θ)
m∗(Rd, θ)
Ux(x,m|Rd, θ) (3.38)
Therefore
VmRd = UmRd −
x∗(Rd, θ)
m∗(Rd, θ)
UxRd = 0 (3.39)
and both x∗(m,Rd, θ) and y∗(m,Rd, θ) falls in Rd as sgnUxRd = sgnUmRd < 0.
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I have proven in Chapter 2 that V is quasi-supermodular in (y,m) with respect
to the usual order. Now I have shown that V satisfies single-crossing property in
(y,m| −Rd) with respect to the same order. By Milgrom and Shannon (1994),
y∗(Rd, θ)↘ Rd and m∗(Rd, θ)↘ Rd
since d∗(Rd, θ) = w − y∗(Rd, θ), deposits increase in the return offered.
Instead of analyzing the comparative statics of (x,m) in Rd, I do so in (q,m)
are prove that q∗(Rd, θ) falls in Rd. Since q∗(Rd, θ) = x∗(Rd, θ)(1 − m∗(Rd, θ), the
suggested signs indicate x∗(Rd, θ) falls in Rd as well.
The objective function taking (q,m) as the controls is defined in Proposition 2 of
Chapter 2 by
Q(q,m|Rd, θ) ≡ max
q,m
∫
u(wRd + q%(s,m|Rd))f(s|θ)ds (3.40)
= V (qm/(1−m),m|Rd, θ) (3.41)
where %(S,m) = 1/(1 − m) × `(S,m). I relate the derivatives evaluated at the
optimum as
Qq =
m
1−mVy (3.42)
Qm = Vm +
q
(1−m)2Vy (3.43)
Qqm =
m
1−m
(
Vym +
q
(1−m)2Vyy
)
≤ 0 (3.44)
Qmm =
(
Vmm +
q
(1−m)2Vym
)
+
q
(1−m)2
(
Vym +
q
(1−m)2Vyy
)
≤ 0 (3.45)
and by the algorithm I develop in Proposition 1 of Chapter 2,(
Vmm +
q
(1−m)2Vym
)
≤ 0 (3.46)
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I use these relations as follows. Since VmRd = 0, differentiating (3.42) and (3.43)
in Rd and evaluating them at the optimum
−QmRd
−QqRd
=
q∗
(1−m∗)m∗ =
x∗
m∗
(3.47)
Since q∗(m,R − d, θ)m/(1 −m) = y∗(m,Rd, θ) by (3.42) and y∗ is increasing in
m, I get
−Qqm
−Qqq = −q
∗′(m,Rd, θ) ≤ x
∗
m∗
(3.48)
Lastly, by (3.46) I have the inequality
Qmm − x
∗
m∗
Qqm = Vmm +
q
(1−m)2Vym ≤ 0 (3.49)
Now combine (3.47), (3.48) and (3.49) to a single chain of inequalities:
−Qqm
−Qqq ≤
x∗
m∗
=
−QmRd
−QqRd
≤ −Qmm−Qqm (3.50)
The rest of the proof follows from applying Implicit Function Theorem to two
first-order conditions of Q(q,m|θ) and solving two equations with two unknowns
Qqqq
∗′(Rd) +Qqmm∗′(Rd) +QqRd = 0 (3.51)
Qqmq
∗′(Rd) +Qmmm∗′(Rd) +QmRd = 0 (3.52)
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the optimum and therefore suppressed
in the notation. Express q∗′(Rd) as linear functions of m∗′(Rd)
q∗′(Rd) =
QqRd
−Qqq −
Qqm
Qqq
m∗′(Rd) (3.53)
q∗′(Rd) =
QmRd
−Qqm −
Qmm
Qqm
m∗′(Rd) (3.54)
By the chain of inequalities (3.50), (3.53) and (3.54) are decreasing functions such
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q∗′(Rd)
m∗′(Rd)
(3.53)
(3.54)
Figure 3.6: Equations (3.53) and (3.54)
that
1. (3.53) is flatter than (3.54)
2. The x′(Rd)-intercept of (3.53) is bigger than that of (3.54)
3. The m′(Rd)-intercept of (3.53) is smaller than that of (3.54)
Figure 3.6 plots (3.53) and (3.54) consistent with the properties listed above. The
lines cross uniquely at the third quadrant where
q∗(Rd, θ)↘ Rd and m∗(Rd, θ)↘ Rd
concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The equilibriumR∗d(θ) satisfies κ
D(R∗d(θ), θ) = κ
S(R∗d(θ), θ).
Consider the difference as Rd → Rf :
lim
Rd→Rf
κD(Rd, θ)− κS(Rd, θ) = (1 + φ)q(Rf , θ)− q(Rf , θ) > 0 (3.55)
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Evaluate the difference as Rd → E[S|θ]:
lim
Rd→E[S|θ]
κD(Rd, θ)− κS(Rd, θ) = 0− (
w
(
E[S|θ]
Rf
− 1
)
1− 1
φ
) < 0 (3.56)
Therefore, there must exist at least one interior R∗d(θ) such that the difference is
zero.
To prove uniqueness, observe that evaluated at (3.20):
∂
∂Rd
(
κD(Rd, θ)− κS(Rd, θ)
)
= (1 + φ)qRd
−
dRd
(
Rd
Rf
− 1
)
+ d
Rf
1− 1
1+φ
< 0 (3.57)
as qRd ≤ 0 and dRd ≥ 0. Therefore, R∗d(θ) must be unique, and so is κ∗(θ).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Totally differentiate (3.18) and (3.19) evaluated at (3.20)
in θ.
κ∗′(θ) = (1 + φ)
(
qRd(R
∗
d, θ)R
∗′
d (θ) + qθ(R
∗
d, θ)
)
(3.58)
κ∗′(θ) =
1
1− 1
1+φ
(
(dRd(R
∗
d, θ)R
∗′
d (θ) + dθ(R
∗
d, θ))(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) + d(R
∗
d, θ)
Rf
R∗′d (θ)
)
(3.59)
The intersection of the linear functions on (κ∗′(θ), R∗′d (θ)) space determines both
signs. (3.58) is a decreasing function of R∗′d (θ) as qRd ≤ 0. (3.59) is a increasing
function of R∗′d (θ) as all the terms of the coefficient dRd(R
∗
d, θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) + d(R∗d,θ)
Rf
are
positive.
Consider the κ∗′(θ)-intercepts when R∗′d (θ) = 0. (3.58) has a positive intercept
since qθ > 0. However, (3.59) has a negative intercept since dθ(R
∗
d, θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) < 0
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R∗′d (θ)
κ∗′(Rd)
(3.58)
(3.59)
Figure 3.7: Equations (3.58) and (3.59)
Finally, consider the R∗′d (θ)-intercepts. (3.58) crosses the point(
0,
qθ(R
∗
d, θ)
−qRd(R∗d, θ)
)
(3.60)
whereas (3.59) crosses the point
(
0,
−dθ(R∗d, θ)(R
∗
d(θ)
Rf
− 1)
dRd(R
∗
d, θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) + d(R∗d,θ)
Rf
)
(3.61)
By the ranking of elasticity of substitution in (3.16):
qθ
−qRd
≥ −dθ
dRd
=
−dθ(R∗d, θ)(R
∗
d(θ)
Rf
− 1)
dRd(R
∗
d, θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1)
(3.62)
≥
−dθ(R∗d, θ)(R
∗
d(θ)
Rf
− 1)
dRd(R
∗
d, θ)(
R∗d(θ)
Rf
− 1) + d(R∗d,θ)
Rf
(3.63)
I plot (3.58) and (3.59) according to these specifications. The unique intersection
of (3.58) and (3.59) occurs at the first quadrant where R∗′d (θ) > 0 and κ
∗′(θ) > 0.
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